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The Evidence for Constitutionalization of 
the WTO: Revisiting the Telmex Report 
Theodore Kill∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The discourse surrounding constitutionalization of the 
WTO remains divisive and contentious. Despite the fact that 
arguments for and against constitutionalization of the WTO 
derive much of their cogency from their potential to affect 
material outcomes within the multilateral trading system, the 
literature remains silent with regard to case studies of exactly 
how a particular constitutional conception has concretely 
impacted the WTO Dispute Settlement System. This article 
fills that gap by demonstrating how the concept of “rights-
based constitutionalism” was central to the coherence of the 
Panel Report in Mexico—Measures Affecting 
Telecommunications Services. In its Report, the panel resolved 
several threshold issues of first impression regarding the 
concepts of interconnection, accounting rates and the mode of 
supply of basic telecommunications services. The panel’s 
treatment of these legal issues has been criticized by many 
commentators. With the benefit of the constitutional discourse 
that has blossomed in the years following the report, however, 
this article argues that the apparent inconsistencies within the 
 
∗ Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State.  I am grateful for the 
comments of Robert Howse on a very early version of this article.  I thank the 
participants of the 2009–10 SIAS Summer Institute on Comparative Federalism 
and Separation of Powers, and in particular Professors Daniel Halberstam and 
Christoph Möllers, for helping me to explore the issues of global constitutionalism 
underpinning this article.  This article was drafted and completed before my 
employment with the U.S. Department of State.  The views expressed herein are 
my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government or the 
Department of State.   
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Telmex Report can best be understood as the product of a 
particular vision of the WTO as a constitutional order 
established to safeguard the rights of individuals within the 
multilateral trading system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate regarding constitutionalization of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) can at times reach a fever pitch.1 
The battle lines are typically drawn at a high degree of 
abstraction centering around principles of constitutional justice 
or global subsidiarity.2 Ideas such as these derive their cogency 
from their ability to affect material outcomes within the 
multilateral trading system, yet the literature remains silent 
with regard to case studies of exactly how a particular 
constitutional conception has concretely impacted the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System.3 This article fills that gap by 
demonstrating how the concept of “rights-based 
constitutionalism”4 was central to the coherence of the WTO 
Panel Report in Mexico—Measures Affecting 
Telecommunications Services (“Telmex Report”).5  
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert Howse, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
Constitutional Justice: A Reply, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 945 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional 
Justice: A Rejoinder, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 955 (2008). 
 2. Petersmann, supra note 1, at 956. 
 3. The WTO Dispute Settlement System is a term used to encompass the 
complete range of dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions available to 
WTO Members within the WTO.  The system “function[s] very much like a court of 
international trade: there is compulsory jurisdiction, disputes are settled largely by 
applying rules of law, decisions are binding on the parties and sanctions may be 
imposed if decisions are not observed.”  MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. 
SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 104 (2d ed. 2006). 
 4. See generally DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 145 (2005).  Howse and Nicolaïdis refer to this 
vein of constitutionalism as “libertarian.”  Throughout this paper, however, I will 
use the term “rights-based constitutionalism.” Robert Howse and Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is 
a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 236 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
 5. Panel Report, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Telmex Report]. 
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The Telmex Report formed part of a long simmering trade 
dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding 
telecommunications traffic between the two countries. In 
bringing the dispute to the WTO, the United States alleged 
inter alia that Mexico had violated Article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”);6 Article 5.1 and 5.2 
of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications;7 and Sections 1.1 
and 2.2 of the GATS Telecommunications Reference Paper 
(“Reference Paper”).8 In the Telmex Report the panel (“Telmex 
Panel”) found that Mexico had indeed breached several of these 
commitments,9 marking the first time that the WTO dispute 
resolution bodies were called upon to resolve a pure services 
dispute, the first dispute involving the Reference Paper, and 
the first dispute in which a panel applied WTO anti-
competition rules.10 
 
 6. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Art. XVII, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (requiring Members to “accord to services 
and service suppliers of any other Member . . . treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers,”  which is typically 
referred to as a “national treatment” obligation). 
 7. Id. at Annex on Telecommunications Art. 5.1 (requiring Members to 
“ensure that any service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and 
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms and conditions”). Id. at Annex on 
Telecommunications Art. 5.2 (requiring Members to “ensure that service suppliers 
of any other Member have access to and use of any public telecommunications 
transport network or service offered within or across the border of that Member, 
including private leased circuits”). 
 8. Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper states that “[a]ppropriate measures 
shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, 
are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.”  
Section 2.2 of the Reference Paper states that “[i]nterconnection with a major 
supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible point in the network.” Reference 
Paper, GATS Negotiating group on basic telecommunications para. 2.1 (Apr. 24 
1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.ht
m. 
 9. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para.  7.216 (finding that Mexico has 
failed to fulfill its commitment to providing interconnection at cost oriented rates 
under TRP §2.2); id. at para. 7.269 (finding that Mexico had failed to fulfill its 
commitment to prevent anti-competitive practices under TRP §1.1); id. at para.  
7.335 (finding that Mexico had failed to fulfill its commitment to ensure that U.S. 
service suppliers were granted access to public telecommunications in Mexico on 
reasonable terms under GATT Telecommunications Annex 5(a)); id. at paras. 7.381, 
7.385, 7.389 (finding that Mexico’s failure to grant access to private leased circuits 
and the Mexican telecommunications regulation regime were inconsistent with 
GATS Telecommunications Annex 5(b)). 
 10. See William J. Davey, Specificities of WTO dispute settlement in services 
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On a policy level, commentators have framed the Telmex 
Panel’s approach as reflecting a choice between two conceptions 
of the nature of the rules embodied in the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement.11 On one view, the disciplines in the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement created obligations only with regard to regulations 
actually promulgated by a government. On the competing view, 
the WTO Telecoms Agreement required WTO Members 
(“Members”) to remedy the anticompetitive practices of private 
actors.12 The Telmex Report resolved this debate in favor of the 
latter view. In the following analysis, however, this article 
highlights an antecedent legal determination. Namely, in order 
for the Telmex Panel to find itself in a position to make this 
critical policy choice, it first had to find that the dispute fell 
within the scope of the WTO Telecoms Agreement. This 
required the Telmex Panel to resolve threshold issues of first 
impression regarding the concepts of interconnection, 
accounting rates and the mode of supply of basic 
telecommunications services. The Telmex Panel’s treatment of 
these legal issues has been criticized by many commentators, 
including the leading WTO treatise which has labeled the 
panel’s conclusion with regard to mode of supply as “an 
untenable outcome.”13 With the benefit of the constitutional 
 
cases, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 276, 
289 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); Andrew W. Shoyer, 
Lessons learned from litigating GATS disputes: Mexico—Telecoms, in GATS AND 
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 225, 226 (Marion 
Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008);  Shin-yi Peng, Trade in 
Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 293, 313 
(2007); Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic 
Research,  Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WTO NEWS 
11 (July 2004), http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wtonews1
1etxt/$FILE/wtonews11e.txt. 
 11. The WTO Telecoms Agreement is a term used to refer to the specialized 
regime which governs a WTO member’s commitments in the telecommunications 
sector. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3 at 678. See infra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
 12. See Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO’s First Antitrust Case—Mexican Telecom: A 
Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271, 272–73 (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 311, at 687; MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 394 (3d 
ed. 2005); Eric H. Leroux, From Periodicals to Gambling: A review of systemic issues 
addressed by WTO adjudicatory bodies under the GATS, in GATS AND THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 236, 257–58 (Marion Panizzon, 
Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); Chan-Mo Chung, Interpretation of 
“Interconnection” by the WTO Mexico-Telecommunications Panel: A Critique, 41 J. 
WORLD TRADE 783 (2007); Damien J. Neven & Petros C. Mavroidis, Mexico—
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discourse that has blossomed in the years following the report, 
however, this article argues that the apparent inconsistencies 
within the Telmex Report can best be understood as the product 
of a particular vision of the WTO as a constitutional order 
established to safeguard the rights of individuals within the 
multilateral trading system. Viewed through the lens of this 
rights-based constitutional theory, the otherwise irreconcilable 
positions adopted by the Telmex Report become intelligible.14  
This article assesses the extent to which an individual 
emanation of WTO jurisprudence could be said to reflect a 
certain constitutional vision of the WTO. Even with this caveat, 
however, it is undeniable that the discourse of 
constitutionalization can create a sort of feedback loop serving 
to further entrench the notion of the WTO as a constitutional 
organization.15 Observations regarding a given institution’s 
“constitution” are themselves internalized, whether contested 
or embraced, in subsequent constitutional discourse such that 
the simple act of framing a question in constitutional terms can 
serve to reify the object of study. The aim of this article is to 
inquire into the extent to which a particular type of 
constitutionalism has already begun to manifest itself within 
the GATS and what effects this may be expected to have. Part I 
introduces the concept of rights-based constitutionalism with a 
particular emphasis on its application to the world trading 
regime. Part II sets forth the facts and law at issue in the 
Telmex Report. This Part aims to show the state of play that 
existed in the international telecommunications field prior to 
the Telmex Report. Part III examines the outcome of the Telmex 
Report and demonstrates that at least part of its most 
 
Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (WT/DS204/R) A Comment on 
“El mess in TELMEX”, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 188 (Henrik Horn & Petros 
C. Mavroidis eds., 2006); J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Überregulation without 
Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration 
on Telecommunications Services, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (2004); Philip Marsden, 
WTO decides its first competition case, with disappointing results, COMPETITION 
LAW INSIGHT, May 2004, at 3. 
 14. See Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 511, 556 
(2008). 
 15. See Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in 
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 38–39 (Gráinne de 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The 
WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
647, 668 (2006); Andrew Lang, Book Review, Deborah Cass, The 
Constitutionalization of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006). 
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controversial legal determinations are capable of 
comprehension as a product of rights-based constitutional 
theory. Part IV concludes by providing an assessment of the 
potential impact that Telmex-style constitutionalization could 
have on the WTO, both with regard to the jurisprudence of the 
WTO and its legitimacy. 
I. RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The term “constitutional” has many different meanings.16 
For the rights-based constitutionalist, and hence for purposes 
of the analysis contained in this article, constitutionalism is 
considered to be an amalgam of liberal democratic principles, 
such as the rule of law and separation of powers, that have 
developed over centuries of experimentation so as to protect the 
rights of individual citizens.17 These principles apply to 
 
 16. See e.g., CASS, supra note 4;  Richard Collins, Constitutionalism as Liberal-
Juridical Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 251, 253 (2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance in the 
WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL 
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 5, 34 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006); Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The 
Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the 
WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623 (2006); Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning of 
International Constitutional Law, in TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES 
IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 837, 839–40 (Ronald St. John 
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 2005); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de 
l’ordre juridique international, 297 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 227 (2002); Peter 
Holmes, The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, in THE EU AND 
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 59, 60 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne 
Scott eds., 2001) (noting that economists “have a tradition of using the terms 
‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalisation’ to cover almost any arrangement that 
precommits economic policy to a fixed set of rules”); Howse and Nicolaïdis, supra 
note 4, at 235–36; Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 216, 258–62 (1994).  
 17. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European and International Constitutional 
Law: Time for Promoting “Cosmopolitan Democracy” in the WTO, in THE EU AND 
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 81, 97 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne 
Scott eds., 2001) [hereinafter Petersmann, European and International 
Constitutional Law”] (listing the “constitutional principles of freedom and non-
discrimination”);Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International 
Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships, 4 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 11–16 (2001) [hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights and 
International Economic Law] (listing “cosmopolitan constitutional law”, 
“international constitutionalism”, and “national constitutionalism” among the eight 
core principles of constitutionalism which open the theory to a sort of endogeneity 
bias);  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic 
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constitutionalized institutions of all varieties with different 
implications in each instance. Thus, the doctrine of separation 
of powers may be applied to a State or an international 
organization, perhaps with divergent institutional and policy 
prescriptions, although both the State and the international 
organization will be considered to have adopted constitutional 
systems to the extent that the principles are deployed to limit 
governmental powers so as to increase individual freedom.18 
Within the world trading system, however, for the rights-
based constitutionalist the relevant constitutional 
considerations are brought into sharper focus. Institutions 
within the world trading system have a definite role to play in 
providing the proper conditions within which market 
transactions can flourish.19 In this context, the “basic objective” 
of constitutionalism is “constituting and limiting government 
 
Law—Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-economic 
Areas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 244 (1999) [hereinafter Petersmann, Dispute 
Settlement] (listing “freedom, non-discrimination, fair procedures and rule of law” 
as “constitutional guarantees”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law 
and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 3, 
11–19 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Petersmann, International 
Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System] (listing the 
“constitutional values of freedom and non-discrimination”); Petersmann, 
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 N.W. J. INT’L L & BUS. 398, 
425–26 (1996–97) [hereinafter Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International 
Organizations] (listing “freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, separation of 
powers and other fundamental rights”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Limited 
Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers? Why Effective Judicial Review of 
Foreign Trade Restrictions Depends on Individual Rights, in NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 537, 538–40 (Meinhard Hilf & 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (listing the supremacy of individual rights 
over state power and the need to protect “equality before the law” as necessary 
premises to consider when discussing international economic law). 
 18. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’ 
to ‘Constitutional Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic 
Cooperation Among Citizens, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L 827, 844 (2008) [hereinafter 
Petersmann, Judging Judges]. 
 19. This idea is best expressed in the quote “in the absence of a world 
government, ‘public goods’ like non-discriminatory access to foreign markets and 
supplies, monetary stability and international legal certainty can be produced only 
through liberal international rules with ‘constitutional functions’.”  ERNST-ULRICH 
PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIMC LAW XL (1991) [hereinafter PETERSMANN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS]. See also Petersmann, Constitutionalism and 
International Organizations, supra note 17, at 406 (listing “individual liberties and 
actionable property rights” as preconditions for the proper functioning of economic 
markets).   
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powers for the protection of equal rights of citizens by means of 
constitutional rules of a higher legal rank.”20 Parsing of this 
basic objective reveals that the theory relies upon three 
premises whose full realization within the world trading 
system would require significant adaptation of the dominant 
legal and institutional conceptions of the WTO. First, the 
theory presupposes that individuals possess rights (“equal 
rights of citizens”) that are cognizable within the law of the 
WTO. Second, the theory posits the existence of broad 
“constitutional rules” that are of a “higher legal rank” than 
other non-constitutional rules within the world trading regime. 
Third, in order for these constitutional rules to serve their 
appointed function of protecting individual rights, rights-based 
constitutionalism envisages certain modalities by which the 
constitutional rules should be deployed by the judiciary so as to 
limit government’s ability (“limiting government powers”) to 
interfere with individual rights.  
Under a rights-based constitutional theory, the 
justification for this tripartite transformation of the world 
trading system is that the WTO Agreement was itself a 
 
 20. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 6; see also Petersmann, Constitutionalism 
and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 405, 445–46 (listing “dignity, 
liberty” and “legal equality” as basic rights); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human 
Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging 
UN Human Rights Constitution, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 
39 (Frederick M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufman & Thomas Cottier eds., 
2006) [hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare] 
(listing “freedom of choice, political competition and equal individual rights” as 
rights of citizens); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and 
International Economic Law, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 3, 5 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter Petersmann, National Constitutions] (listing “equal treatment, 
equality, due process and fairness” as outcomes of these long-term considerations).  
This definition broadly coheres with the “core” of international constitutionalism 
identified by Klabbers, namely “placing limits on the activities of international 
organizations, subjecting those organizations to standards of proper behavior.” Jan 
Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 31, 32 (2004). See also Brun-
Otto Bryde, International Democratic Constitutionalism, in TOWARDS WORLD 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
103, 106 (Ronald St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 2005). The 
“proper behavior” in this case would be respect for the rules of a higher legal rank. 
Note that the government powers to be limited by constitutional rules include those 
exercised by international organizations.  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights 
and the Law of the World Trade Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 241, 249 (2003) 
[hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the WTO]. 
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constitutional moment. By consenting to the WTO Agreement 
the WTO Members effectively “‘constitutionalize[d]’ the world 
trading system in response to the new challenges of the 
globalization of the world economy and of civil society.”21 This 
can be problematic when attempting to apply rights-based 
theory to the reality of the modern trade law regime since the 
WTO and its Members do not view the institution through this 
constitutional lens.22 As a result, much of the rights-based 
constitutionalist literature advocates for changes to bring the 
WTO into conformity with the three conditions listed above, 
which themselves are often presented as either self-evident or 
faits accomplis. The distinction between advocacy and 
identification, between prescription and depiction, which is 
customarily blurred in constitutional rhetoric,23 is at times 
completely obscured in rights-based constitutional discourse 
regarding the WTO.24 The following three sub-parts summarize 
the critically transformative trinity of concepts within rights-
based constitutional theory as applied to the world trading 
regime, namely that individuals possess constitutional rights, 
that these rights consists of broad economic freedoms, and that 
judges have a special role to play in protecting individual 
economic rights. 
A. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE 
It is immediately apparent that if a legal system whose 
basic objective is to secure the “equal rights of citizens”25 is to 
achieve its aim, then citizens or individuals under this regime 
must themselves possess rights. As a practical matter, if 
individuals did not possess rights, or if public authorities were 
 
 21. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law 
and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (1998).  
 22. Carmody, supra note 14, at 539; Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. 
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 229 (2003). 
 23. Collins, supra note 16, at 264. 
 24. See CASS, supra note 4, at 152–53.  Cass presents the possibility that this 
ambiguity is consciously executed so as to expand the scope of debate relating to 
the WTO.  Id. at 161–62. In this regard, rights-based constitutional theory follows 
in the tradition of what Koskenniemi has identified as “idealism” in international 
law.  MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 209–18 (2005).  
 25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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not vested with the power to vindicate those rights, the 
enterprise of securing individual rights through 
constitutionalization would be stillborn. Thus, the classic model 
of public international law where, absent express provisions to 
the contrary, only States possess the right to bring claims for 
violations of treaties on an international plane,26 presents an 
inhospitable terrain for a theory of rights-based 
constitutionalization to take root. The WTO is in many ways 
innovative from the perspective of public international law,27 
but not as regards piercing the State veil and endowing citizens 
with rights. With the exception of intellectual property rights, 
the rights and obligations created and disputed within the 
WTO are those of States, not individual citizens.28 
This state of affairs is sub-optimal for the rights-based 
constitutional theorist whose Kantian grounding places the 
interests and rights of individual citizens at the epicenter of the 
legal universe.29 This human rights revolution in international 
law requires “a citizen-oriented national and international 
constitutional framework different from the power-oriented, 
state-centred conceptions of traditional international law.”30 It 
is not surprising then that according to rights-based theory the 
substantive rights within the WTO have as “their ultimate 
 
 26. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (6th ed., 2008). 
 27. In particular the WTO’s introduction of compulsory dispute resolution, 
adoption of decisions by negative consensus, and the idea that adjudicatory bodies 
may suggest methods of compliance to Members found to be in violation of their 
WTO commitments may all be considered innovative from the perspective of public 
international law. 
 28. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, para. 7.72, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 29. See Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 
supra note 17, at 422–26; Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic 
Welfare, supra note 20, at 31; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity, 
Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston, 13 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 845, 850 (2002) [hereinafter Petersmann, Rejoinder to Alston]; 
Petersmann, supra note 21, at 7–11. On the nature of Petersmann’s claim to 
grounding in Kantian thought see Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and 
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 815, 837–41 (2002). 
 30. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ 
for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons 
from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 649 (2002); Peters, supra note 
16, at 597 (stating that a classic theme of constitutionalism is seeking “to contain 
political power in order to safeguard the autonomy of the individual”); Christian 
Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a 
New Century, 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 161–62 (1999).  
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function to protect the rights of private citizens.”31 This citizen-
oriented purpose of the WTO’s rules, combined with the 
inherent nature of economic law as concerning individual 
action, militates in favor of a reallocation of procedural as well 
as substantive rights.32 Because international economic law “is 
an instrument for empowering and protecting mutually 
beneficial cooperation among citizens across frontiers, judges 
should . . . recogniz[e] citizens as legal subjects.”33 The 
argument proceeds from observation to advocacy; because 
individual citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of WTO laws, 
individual citizens should be capable of vindicating their 
interest in these laws. 
For the rights-based constitutionalist, the WTO’s ability to 
protect individuals is frustrated by producer-capture; the 
overriding emphasis on producer concerns at the WTO operates 
“to the detriment of the general citizen interest in maximizing 
consumer welfare through liberal trade.”34 Bypassing the 
producer interests so as to address individual rights at the 
WTO level “serves broader constitutional functions for 
empowering individuals as legal subjects (‘market citizens’) 
rather than mere objects of integration, notably for protecting 
their personal self-development and equal basic rights against 
welfare-reducing government limitations.”35 The emphasis on 
 
 31. Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra 
note 17, at 453. See also Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 211.  
 32. Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 225. 
 33. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law 
and ‘Constitutional Justice’, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 773 (2008) [hereinafter 
Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional 
Justice’]. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights in European and 
Global Integration Law: Principles for Constitutionalizing the World Economy, in 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION: STUDIES IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 383, 
401–02 (Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis & Yves Mèny eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights in European and Global Integration Law]. 
 34. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. 
INT’L. ECON. L. 19, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Petersmann, The WTO Constitution]. See 
also Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional 
Justice’, supra note 33, at 797 (2008) (noting a “often one-sided focus” on 
governmental and producer interests); Petersmann, Human Rights and 
International Economic Law, supra note 17, at 27. 
 35. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’ Advocated by the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour 
Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 621 
(2004) [hereinafter Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’]. See also 
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increasing market freedoms has exposed advocates of rights-
based constitutionalization to accusations of harboring a desire 
to Lochnerize WTO law.36 The blindness of rights-based 
theories to the dangers of Lochner era jurisprudence is 
evidenced by a tendency within the theory not to question the 
potential adverse effects of universal robust privileging of 
individual economic freedoms.37 
Rights-based constitutional theory complements principled 
arguments in favor of vesting WTO rights in individual citizens 
with consequentialist justifications rooted in the WTO’s 
legitimacy and efficacy.38 With regard to the former 
justification, the promotion of “citizen-oriented” economic 
freedoms is seen as increasing the legitimacy of international 
tribunals to engage in judicial review of State actions.39 The 
argument with regard to efficacy works on at least two levels. 
At the horizontal level among States, it is argued that citizen 
enforcement of international law is a more effective means of 
ensuring peaceful resolution of international disputes.40 At the 
vertical level, concerning the relations between a State and its 
own citizens, bestowing rights and the ability to enforce them 
upon citizens is seen as the most effective way of providing 
maximum freedom to all.41 Accordingly, under the rights-based 
constitutional theory the structure of rights and obligations at 
the WTO should be rearranged. As a normative project “the 
citizens must become the main subjects and beneficiaries of 
 
Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at 
107.  
 36. Howse, supra note 1, at 946. In Lochner v. New York, the U.S. Supreme 
Court invalidated regulations regarding the maximum number of hours a baker 
could work based upon the idea that such regulations violated the bakers’ freedom 
to contract. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). According to one scholar, 
Lochner symbolizes “not merely an aggressive judicial role, but an approach that 
imposes a constitutional requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to 
refer to preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under 
the baseline of the common law.” Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873, 875 (1987). 
 37. Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 14.  
 38. See CASS, supra note 4, at 162–63.  
 39. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 794. 
 40. See Petersmann, supra note 21, at 21; Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, 
supra note 17, at 238. 
 41. See Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 26; see also 
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 
424.  
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WTO rules.”42 On this view the WTO is, or should become, “as 
much vertical as horizontal.”43 
1. Constitutional rules 
Having re-oriented the WTO bargain away from State and 
producer interests and vested citizens with the ability to invoke 
their individual economic rights within the multilateral trading 
system, the question for the rights-based constitutionalist then 
becomes one of identifying the constitutional rules that 
constrain the policy options available to governments so as to 
protect these individual rights. Rights-based constitutionalists 
maintain that there exists a WTO “constitution” that is 
superior to the Agreements listed in the Annexes to the WTO 
Agreement (“Annexes”) and various schedules of 
commitments.44 It is not clear, however, of what exactly this 
“constitution” consists.45 To the extent that the “constitution” 
consists solely of the WTO Agreement itself the proposition is 
non-controversial because Article XVI:3 states that the WTO 
Agreement will prevail over other documents in the event of a 
conflict. Nevertheless, the technical nature of the WTO 
Agreement does not lend itself to performing a constitutional 
function in the sense of protecting individual rights against 
government encroachment.46 In addition, it is difficult if not 
impossible to identify rules in the WTO Agreement which would 
be of a higher legal rank in this sense vis-à-vis the Annexes. 
This is because the articles of the WTO Agreement address 
entirely unrelated matters, such as the administration and 
legal personality of the WTO itself. The preamble to the WTO 
 
 42. Petersmann, The WTO Constitution, supra note 34, at 24. See also 
Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare, supra note 20, at 33. 
 43. Steve Charnovitz, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 253, 253 (Roger B. Porter et 
al. eds., 2001). 
 44. See, e.g., Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, 
supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 45. It is apparent, however, that the term constitution as used in this context 
is not to be equated with the normal sense in which the term is used in reference to 
international organizations to refer to “the legal framework within which an 
autonomous community of a functional (sectoral) nature realizes its respective 
functional goal . . . .” Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 53 (2006).  
 46. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 107 
(2005). 
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Agreement refers to certain goals such as full employment, 
sustainable development and environmental protection, but to 
say that these represent rules with which the substantive 
obligations under WTO law must cohere strains the 
interpretive weight that can properly be assigned to the 
preamble.47 
In fact, the constitutional rules advanced by rights-based 
theorists derive more from general principles than from any 
specific text to which the WTO members have agreed. Under a 
rights-based constitutional theory, the basic characteristic of a 
constitutional rule is that it is “universalisable.”48 These 
universalizable rules are avowedly “general and abstract.”49 In 
the case of the WTO, the universalizable rules to be fixed in the 
constitutional firmament are “worldwide guarantees of 
economic freedom”50 with “maximum equal liberty as the ‘first 
principle of justice.’”51 In this sense, economic freedoms such as 
those permitting cross-border trade in goods and services are 
recast as rules with “constitutional functions” because these 
rules constrain the ability of governments to act in certain 
ways inimical to individual rights.52 Such rules derive their 
 
 47. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT]. The preamble to the VCLT itself affirms that 
disputes “should be settled . . . in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law.” Id. at Pmbl. Petersmann has argued that this text “requires 
judges to review their traditionally state-centered conceptions of public 
international law, for example by judicial ‘balancing’ among competing principles, 
rights and other rules of law.” Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 18, at 838. 
 48. Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance, supra note 16, at 16. 
 49. Id. at 15. 
 50. Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, supra note 17, at 23. See also Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, 
supra note 17, at 211–12; Petersmann, European and International Constitutional 
Law, supra note 17, at 102. But see Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: 
Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651 
(2002) (critiquing the indeterminacy of these freedoms). 
 51. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of 
the World Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the 
WTO, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 587 (2004). 
 52. See Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 47–48. See also 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges to the WTO in the 
New Millennium: A Longer-Term Perspective, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647, 663 (2005) 
[hereinafter Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges]; Petersmann, 
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 439; 
Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’, supra note 35, at 616; Petersmann, 
Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note 17, at 14; Petersmann, 
Judging Judges, supra note 18, at 845; Petersmann, supra note 30, at 649. See 
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legitimacy in part from the “universally recognized insight that 
liberal trade and non-discriminatory competition tend to 
maximize consumer welfare.”53 Note, however, that these rules 
can perform their constitutional functions only when construed 
as rights of citizens, not States.54 Hence, according to the 
rights-based constitutional theory, the maximization of the 
liberty and economic freedom of the individual trader or 
consumer should become the universalizable constitutional rule 
animating the WTO. 
2. Protecting constitutional rights and the role of the judiciary 
The previous sub-parts examined two fundamental 
components of the rights-based constitutional conception of the 
WTO. First, in order to protect the equal rights of citizens in 
the world trading system, citizens must become direct subjects 
of these rights. Second, the constitutional rules that the WTO 
should apply to discipline States consist of broad economic 
freedoms vested in individual citizens. The final aspect of the 
rights-based constitutionalist theory is the institutional 
methodology by which the WTO should deploy these 
constitutional rules so as to restrict the ability of governments 
to interfere with individuals’ enjoyment of their rights. 
Consistent with the theory’s Kantian orientation, the 
methodology by which the constitutional freedoms are 
vindicated focuses on the role of judges.55 
According to the rights-based constitutional theory, a 
strong judiciary is implied in any constitutional conception, 
since judges are presumed to be above politics and therefore 
capable of ensuring adherence to constitutional values.56 
Accordingly, domestic as well as international tribunals are 
exhorted to defend constitutional freedoms.57 International 
 
generally Peters, supra note 16, at 585, 599.  
 53. See Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 212. 
 54. Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, supra note 17, at 8. 
 55. See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on 
Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. 
L. 9, 31 (2007); Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 773–75. See also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
 56. See Klabbers, supra note 20, at 33.  
 57. Petersmann has noted that judges in international tribunals must respect 
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tribunals are called to act as “independent guardians of respect 
for equal citizen rights by settling [international economic law] 
disputes in conformity with the human rights obligations of 
governments and the constitutional principles of citizen-driven 
self-governance.”58 In somewhat more concrete terms, this 
mandate requires judges to interpret a State’s obligations “in 
conformity with their citizen-oriented treaty objectives (i.e., to 
promote mutually beneficial economic cooperation among 
citizens) . . . .”59 
The role of the judge is seen as both necessary and 
justified. With regard to necessity, judges must assume the 
mantle of implementing constitutional rules because States 
cannot be relied upon to do so. The rights-based theory notes 
that freedom to trade at the intra-State level “has usually been 
achieved not by reliance on the benevolence of the rulers, but 
rather by the struggles of courageous citizens and judges 
defending individual freedom against discriminatory 
governmental and private restrictions of trade.”60 Applying this 
insight to the world trade regime, “there is hardly any reason 
for judicial deference vis-à-vis discriminatory national 
restrictions in clear violation of the WTO guarantees of freedom 
and non-discrimination.”61 
 
the institutional limits of their mandate. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 39. 
Interestingly, in this same passage he offers the Telmex Report as an example of 
how WTO rules can directly impact the discretion of national legislatures even 
though, strictly speaking, WTO rules do not produce direct effect within a given 
national legal system.  
 58. Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 798. Note that, whereas typically norm 
entrepreneurs in the human rights area emerge from the coordinated civil societies 
of several countries, the right to trade advocacy proceeds from a multinational to a 
national stage. See generally Steve Peers, Fundamental Right or Political Whim? 
WTO Law and the European Court of Justice, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 111, 129–30 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 
2001). 
 59. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutionalism and ‘Public 
Reason’ in Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 877, 890 (Christina 
Binder et al. eds., 2009). 
 60. Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note 
17, at 31; see also Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare, 
supra note 20, at 52; Petersmann, Human Rights in European and Global 
Integration Law, supra note 33, at 391; Petersmann, supra note 30, at 636; 
Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at 
105.  
 61. Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note 
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The justification for positioning judges at the van of the 
rights-based revolution is set forth in legal as well as 
institutional terms. The fact that individuals increasingly bear 
rights under international law is cast as a factor militating in 
favor of a “reformative interpretation” of international 
economic law to protect individual rights where previously this 
was not the case.62 At the institutional level, the argument 
proceeds from the assertion that all international regimes 
ultimately derive their legitimacy from their ability to protect 
basic human rights. Because economic freedoms perform 
“human rights functions,”63 the interpretation of treaty 
obligations so as to expand economic freedoms increases respect 
for human rights and the legitimacy of the institution as well.64 
To the extent that the role of States in this process of 
judicial constitutionalization is taken into account, their 
consent to constitutionalization is considered as implicitly 
given by the nature of their commitments at the WTO. A 
consequence of viewing the adoption of the WTO Agreement as 
a constitutional moment65 is that “self-imposed liberal 
international economic obligations can . . . serve ‘constitutional 
functions’ for a more liberal interpretation, application and 
agreed extension to foreign trade of the corresponding 
constitutional principles of democratic societies such as . . . 
non-discriminatory market access . . . .”66 Pursuant to their 
constitutional mission, judges may even be justified in 
discarding the principle of pacta sunt servanda,67 at least where 
its application to substantive obligations fails to protect human 
 
17, at 32. 
 62. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 772–73; see also Tomuschat, supra note 
30, at 161–62 (describing the general transition from a State-centered to an 
individual-centered system); supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the WTO, supra note 20, at 
268–69; see also John O. McGinnis, A New Agenda for International Human Rights: 
Economic Freedoms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1029, 1032–34 (1999); Petersmann, supra 
note 30, at 643–44; Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law, 
supra note 17, at 92; Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’, supra note 35, at 
616; Petersmann, Rejoinder to Alston, supra note 29, at 847.  
 64. See Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 18, 879–82. 
 65. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 66. PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 19, at XLI. 
 67. See generally VCLT, supra note 47, at art. 26 (defining pacta sunt 
servanda as “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”). 
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rights.68 The overall effect of the rights-based constitutional 
theory is to provide judges with a platform for transforming the 
Dispute Settlement System into a sort of Trojan Horse of 
economic liberalization whereby judges use their constitutional 
authority to aggressively broaden Members’ initial 
liberalization commitments through interpretation.69 
II. LAW AND FACTS IN THE TELMEX REPORT 
The previous section summarized the principal tenets of 
rights-based constitutional theory as relates to the WTO. 
Before evaluating the Telmex Report qua rights-based 
constitutional document, however, it is necessary to understand 
the law and facts in play in that particular case. With regard to 
the law, in order to determine the commitments undertaken by 
a Member in the telecommunications sector a practitioner must 
look to the four components of the WTO Telecoms Agreement: 
the GATS itself, the Annex on Telecommunications, the 
Member’s Reference Paper,70 and the Member’s schedule of 
specific commitments.71 With the exception of the GATS, these 
documents concern themselves principally with technical and 
industry standards. Despite their relatively narrow focus, 
however, the meaning of key technical provisions of the WTO 
Telecoms Agreement remained contested even after the 
Agreement entered into force.72 For purposes of this article, 
issues relating to the scope of the commitments that Members 
had made, as well as the terms “accounting rate” and 
“interconnection,” will be of particular importance. In order to 
 
 68. Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 244. 
 69. See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The 
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 97–98 (2002); Jeffrey 
L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 738–739 (1999). 
 70. See supra note 8. 
 71. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 678; David Luff, 
Telecommunications and Audio-visual Services: Considerations for a Convergence 
Policy at the World Trade Organization Level, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1059, 1061 
(2006); Jingxia Shi, Telecommunications Services in China: Implications of WTO 
Membership, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 579, 582 (2004); see also GATS art. 
XX; Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting, para. 160, WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7, 2005).  
 72. See Peter F. Cowhey, Accounting Rates, Cross-Border Services and the 
Next WTO Round on Basic Telecommunications Services, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL 
CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 51, 51 
(Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004). 
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understand the role of constitutional values in shaping the 
Telmex Panel’s report it is necessary to understand the 
contemporaneous state of debate regarding the issues. The 
following sub-parts, therefore, present brief overviews of 
international trade law relating to accounting rates, 
interconnection, and modes of supply prior to the Telmex 
Report, as well as the underlying factual scenario of the 
dispute. 
A. INTERCONNECTION AND MODES OF SUPPLY 
Interconnection is one of the most important concepts within 
the Reference Paper,73 if not within modern telecommunications 
policy generally.74 The Reference Paper defines interconnection 
as “linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications 
transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one 
supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to 
access services provided by another supplier.”75 The Reference 
Paper requires that interconnection be provided at “cost-oriented 
rates” and “under non-discriminatory terms,” among other 
conditions.76 
Prior to the Telmex Panel’s finding that the term 
“interconnection” embraced international as well as domestic 
interconnection, evidence suggests that the term was primarily 
understood within the telecommunications industry to apply 
only to the domestic variant.77 In other words, the Reference 
Paper’s disciplines regarding interconnection applied to 
telecommunications suppliers of any nationality competing in 
the same domestic market, but Reference Paper imposed no 
obligations with regard to the terms of interconnection offered to 
 
 73. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre LaRouche, Telecommunications Services 
and the World Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1997 at 5, 28; see also 
Shi, supra note 71, at 598; MARK NAFTEL & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, THE TELECOMS 
TRADE WAR: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 110 (2000); Chantal Blouin, The WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications: A Reevaluation, 24 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 135, 137 
(2000). 
 74. See William H. Melody, Interconnection: Cornerstone of Competition, in 
TELECOM REFORM: PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES 53, 53 
(William H. Melody ed., 1997). 
 75. Reference Paper, supra note 8, at para. 2.1. 
 76. Id. at para. 2.2(a). 
 77. Chung, supra note 13, at n.30. 
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incoming international signals.78 The close resemblance between 
the definition of interconnection contained in the Reference 
Paper and the definition commonly used to refer to domestic 
interconnection in both the United States and the European 
Union supports this view.79 This restrictive view of 
interconnection, moreover, is consistent with the pre-Telmex 
Report literature which indicated that the Reference Paper’s 
disciplines regarding interconnection were designed to aid 
foreign entrants attempting to establish a physical presence in 
domestic telecommunications markets.80 At least one country, 
however—Australia—took a broader view of the term, stating 
that points of interconnection for purposes of the Reference 
Paper could occur at “the international exchange, the trunk 
exchange, the local exchange, a radiocommunications base 
station, or any other point that may or may not be within 
national borders.”81 
Assuming that the term interconnection is capable of 
embracing the domestic as well as international variants, the 
conditions of international connection would be subject to the 
Reference Paper disciplines only if the Member in question has 
made a commitment to apply the Reference Paper to 
telecommunications services being provided via a particular 
mode of supply. The GATS provides for four so called “modes of 
supply” which are typically referred to by number. Mode I 
supply encompasses “cross-border supply” of services where the 
service supplier and consumer remain in their respective 
distinct Member countries and the service crosses the border.82 
 
 78. Id. at 789–90. 
 79. Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 28; cf. Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The United StatesJapan 
Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 HARV. J. INT’L L. 317, 327–28 (2002) 
(noting the strong similarities between the Reference Paper and American 
regulatory policies embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
 80. See, e.g., Blouin, supra note 73, at 137–38; Markus Fredebeul-Krein & 
Andreas Freytag, The Case for a More Binding WTO Agreement on Regulatory 
Principles in Telecommunications Markets, 23 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 625, 
629 (1999). 
 81. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from 
Australia: Interconnection, para. 12, S/C/W/110/Add.9 (June 24, 1999). See 
generally id. at para. 13 (“A carrier which either owns or controls 
telecommunications facilities should be required to permit, on request, the 
interconnection of those facilities with an international carrier seeking access to 
those facilities, on the same terms as permitted to a national carrier.”). 
 82. GATS Art. 1.2(a). 
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Mode II supply encompasses “consumption abroad” where the 
service consumer travels to the country of the service supplier 
to obtain a service.83 Mode III supply encompasses “commercial 
presence” where a service supplier from one Member country 
establishes a physical territorial presence in another Member 
in which the service consumer is located.84 Mode IV supply 
encompasses “presence of natural persons” where the service 
supplier is a natural person who travels to the country in which 
the service consumer is located to provide a service.85  
Members may commit to liberalization of service sectors 
with regard to specific modes of supply. For example, a Member 
could make a full commitment to the liberalization of gambling 
services under mode I, but make no commitment under mode 
III. This would have the effect of opening the Member’s market 
to gambling services providers located on the territory of other 
Members while preserving the discretion to prevent gambling 
services providers from other Members from establishing 
operations within its territory. Identification of which services 
are at issue and under which mode of supply the services are 
being provided will therefore be of critical importance in 
determining whether a particular measure falls within the 
scope of a Member’s WTO obligations in many GATS disputes. 
International voice telephony services where the 
originating carrier does not have a physical presence in the 
country of termination qualify as cross-border or mode I supply. 
This is because the service, not the consumer or the service 
provider, crosses the border. Prior to the Telmex Report, it had 
been the long-established practice within the 
telecommunications industry and telecommunications trade 
law that the terminating carrier, that is the 
telecommunications provider in the country into which the call 
has been placed, was considered to have exported a service (the 
service of termination) that the originating carrier was 
considered to have imported into the country from which the 
call was placed. As some commentators have observed: 
[A]n international call from the US to Mexico can be seen as the 
bundle of two strict complements, namely a routing from the US 
subscriber to the border and a termination within Mexico. The US 
 
 83. GATS Art. 1.2(b). 
 84. GATS Art. 1.2(c). 
 85. GATS Art. 1.2(d). 
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operator is selling the bundle to a US subscriber and is purchasing 
one element of the bundle (one input) from a Mexican operator. From 
this perspective, Mexican operators are thus selling one service 
(termination) to a foreign firm. In other words, they are producing a 
service using domestic inputs and selling it to a foreign undertaking. 
This is literally a mode I type of supply but in this perspective the 
supplier is the Mexican operator which terminates the call . . . .86 
In 2000, Australia concurred with this view, stating that “the 
termination of a telephone call or similar service that 
originates in another Member is an exported service.”87 
Conversely, therefore, “it is the access to the network in a 
foreign country which is imported” into the State in which the 
call originates.88 As will be explained below in Part IV, this 
traditional conception of international trade in 
telecommunication services conflicted with a rights-based, 
individual-focused conception of the WTO. 
1. Accounting rates 
The accounting rate system is a “century-old” method of 
allocating revenue between telecommunications companies 
engaged in the international trade of telecommunications 
services.89 Traditionally, international telecommunications 
service was provided between two national monopoly telecoms 
 
 86. Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 199–200; see also Shoyer, supra note 
10, at 231; Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 10. 
 87. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from 
Australia: Negotiating Proposal for Telecommunication Services, para. 8, 
S/CSS/W/17 (Dec. 5, 2000); see also Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunications, Communication from Australia: Response to Questionnaire on 
Basic Telecommunications, pt. 2(A)(iii), S/NGBT/W/3/Add.14 (Oct. 21, 1994). 
 88. Anders Henten, Trade in Telecom-Based Services, in TELECOM REFORM: 
PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES 407, 412 (William H. Melody ed., 
1997); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 128 n.32 
(2002) (“[S]ince the sending carrier pays the receiving carrier, in trade terms, 
contrary to one’s instincts, the country or carrier terminating a call is functioning 
as an exporter of a service, and the country or carrier sending the call is 
functioning as an importer.”); Kenneth B. Stanley, International Settlements in a 
Changing Global Telecom Market, in TELECOM REFORM: PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND 
REGULATORY PRACTICES 371, 374 (William H. Melody ed., 1997); but see Boutheina 
Guermazi, Reforming international accounting rates: a developing country 
perspective, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 83, 99 (Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004) 
(“[U]nlike the traditional pattern of trade, the country which exports the call must 
pay the country that imports the call for its part in terminating the service.”). 
 89. Guermazi, supra note 88, at 83; see also Stanley, supra note 88, at 372. 
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carriers. The carrier in the country in which the call originated 
would transmit the call over its facilities to the carrier in the 
country where the call was to be terminated. The originating 
carrier would then bill the customer who had placed the call and 
pay the foreign carrier that had terminated the call for its 
services. The rate at which the foreign or terminating carrier 
was compensated was, and is, known as an accounting rate. 
Accounting rates were not necessarily set according to market 
forces, but rather were the product of opaque bilateral 
negotiations between national monopolies.90 
Frustrated by the inability to push through reforms of the 
accounting rate system within the International 
Telecommunications Union, the United States led the charge to 
place reform of the accounting rate system on the agenda during 
negotiations of the WTO Telecoms Agreement.91 An analysis of 
the negotiating history, however, reveals the limitations on the 
intended scope of the nascent WTO telecommunications 
regulatory regime with regard to accounting rates. A February 
1997 Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications 
announced an Understanding that the application of accounting 
rates “would not give rise to action by Members under dispute 
settlement under the WTO.”92 At the time, this Understanding 
was interpreted by some as an agreement to withhold all 
disputes regarding accounting rates.93 The Understanding and 
the advent of the WTO Telecoms Agreement, however, provided 
as much support to those who saw in the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement the end of the accounting rate system94 as to those 
 
 90.  Stanley, supra note 88, at 375. 
 91. See Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 6–7; Richard Joseph & Peter 
Drahos, Contested Arenas in International Telecommunications: Towards an 
Integrated Political Perspective, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 99, 112–13 (Stuart MacDonald & Gary Madden eds., 1998). 
 92.  Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Group on 
Basic Telecommunications, para. VII S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997); see generally Special 
Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Mexico: 
Telecommunication Services, para. 8(ii), S/CSS/W/101, (July 10, 2001) (“Mexico 
considers the ‘Understanding on Accounting Rates’ to be in force . . . .”). 
 93. Guermazi, supra note 88, at 85; see also Daniel Roseman, Domestic 
Regulation and Trade in Telecommunications Services: Experience and Prospects 
Under the GATS, in DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
83, 104 n.8 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2003). 
 94. See, e.g., NAFTEL & SPIWAK, supra note 73, at 114–15 (arguing that, among 
other things, one of the general policy objectives of the WTO was to end the 
international settlement-of-accounts regime); Henten, supra note 88, at 418–19 
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who thought the accounting rate regime would be virtually 
unaffected.95 The Understanding could be interpreted as 
applying only to the most-favoured nation (“MFN”) requirement 
of the GATS such that the Understanding would preclude claims 
based upon accounting rate inconsistency with the MFN 
discipline, but permit claims based upon accounting rate 
inconsistency with any other applicable disciplines. On this view, 
the Understanding reflected the fact that the accounting rates 
system under the International Telecommunications 
Regulations typically resulted in different Members being 
charged different rates, which is to say that the accounting rates 
system in the vast majority of cases constituted an ipso facto 
violation of MFN. The Understanding could thus be read as a 
simple clarification, in light of the fact that the normal 
application of these regulations would give rise to a claim for 
MFN violation,96 that Members were not to submit disputes 
regarding accounting rates qua MFN violation to dispute 
settlement. The WTO Secretariat, however, appeared to tip the 
scales in favour of an interpretation precluding any adjudication 
of disputes over accounting rates when it observed without 
further qualification that “[a]n Understanding between 
Members exists that no dispute on accounting rates should be 
taken to the Dispute Settlement Body.”97 To the extent that this 
view represented a common intention of the parties to leave 
accounting rates unaffected by scheduling telecommunications 
this approach should have received deference in the treaty 
interpretation process.98 Nevertheless, prior to the Telmex 
Report the issue remained an open question. 
 
(arguing that a trade regime in the telecom services area will bring down the 
international accounting rate system).  
 95. See Chung, supra note 13, at 785 (discussing the differences in reaction to 
the WTO telecommunications agreements). 
 96. See Guermazi, supra note 88, at 100 (discussing how the international 
accounting rate regime, as operating today, is in conflict with the MFN principle 
under the GATS). 
 97. Special Session of the Council on the Negotiations, WTO (Dec. 5–6, 2000), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_wk_novdec2000_e.htm#negotiation
s. 
 98. Appellate Body Report, supra note 70, at paras. 159–60; see also, Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment, para. 109, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5, 
1998) (noting that each schedule represents the tariff commitments made as part of 
a common agreement among all members); Isabelle Van Damme, The 
Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 21 (2007) 
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2. The facts: Mexican telecommunications regulations and WTO 
commitments 
With the concepts of accounting rates and the relation 
between interconnection and modes of supply in mind, this 
section examines the particular facts and law at issue in the 
Telmex Report. The corporation at the heart of the eponymous 
report, Télefonos de México (Telmex), is a major global player 
in telecommunications. With the financial backing of the likes 
of France Telecom and Southwestern Bell Corporation, in the 
year preceding the Telmex Report Telmex ranked 21st in total 
revenue out of all OECD service providers with 10.829 million 
USD.99 Although monopolistic practices are forbidden under the 
Mexican Constitution,100 prior to the adoption of the Telmex 
Report, Telmex had a storied history of appropriating rents as 
evidenced by findings that Telmex’s distortionary power in the 
Mexican market had led to sub-standard service and a price 
structure which reduced affordability for the average 
Mexican.101 Nevertheless, Telmex continuously opposed 
 
(discussing the Appellate Body’s use of common intention in interpreting member’s 
schedules). 
 99. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD 
Communications Outlook 2005, 26 tbl.1.1, 
http://www.thepublicvoice.org/events/tunis05/oecd_outlook.pdf#search=%22OECD
%20Communications%20Outlook%22. Telmex is the centerpiece of billionaire 
Carlos Slim Helú’s empire. See Marc Lacey, Carlos Slim Helú: The Reticent Media 
Baron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at B1 (New York Edition). Mexico received the 
second largest amount of foreign direct investment among developing countries 
from 1990 to 2002 thanks largely to Telmex. Kálmán Kalotay, The Rise of Foreign 
Direct Investment in the Telecommunications Services of Developing Countries, 5 J. 
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 811, 815 tbl.3 (2004). 
 100. Constitución Política de lo Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 28 [C.P.], as 
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). For a 
review of Mexican telecommunications law see Luz Estella Ortiz Nagle, Antitrust 
in the International Telecommunications Sector: The United States Challenges 
Mexico’s TELMEX Monopoly, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 183, 193–213 (2002). 
 101. Traci Carl, Callers, U.S. Phone Carriers in Common Cause Against High 
Mexican Rates, ASS’D PRESS, Aug. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News File. 
According to one study, in 2002 the monthly cost of a telephone subscription in 
Mexico was .34% of per capita GDP, placing Mexico 51st out of 102 markets 
surveyed. See also Kalotay, supra note 98, at 825 tbl.6 (citing THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REPORT 2003–2004: TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 263 (Soumitra Dutta et. al. eds., 2004)). Despite the high 
cost of its services, Telmex continues to generate a large volume of consumer 
complaints. According to the latest statistics available from the Mexican consumer 
protection agency, the Procuradoría Federal del Consumidor, Telmex ranked first 
in the number of consumer complaints registered in 2006 and 2007, but ranked 
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government efforts to increase competition in the Mexican 
telecommunications market.102 Telmex’s fight to maintain its 
market power continued even in the wake of the findings 
against Mexico in the Telmex Report.103 As a result, the Mexican 
telecommunications regulations continued to be among the 
most prohibitive with regard to foreign direct investment 
among OECD countries following the Telmex Report.104 
At the time of the United States’ request for a panel, 
Telmex’s monopoly power was already under attack both 
domestically and internationally.105 In the 1990s the Mexican 
Government established the Comisión Federal de Competencia 
(CFC) and the Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones 
(Cofetel) with mandates to promote competition.106 Increased 
international and domestic regulation, however, threatened but 
did not fundamentally undermine Telmex’s market power.107 
 
only third in this category in 2008. Procuradoría Federal del Consumidor 2006, at 
15, http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual06.pdf; Procuradoría 
Federal del Consumidor 2007, at para. 5.1, 
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual07.pdf; Procuradoría 
Federal del Consumidor 2008, at 15, 
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual08.pdf. 
 102. See Teléfonos de México S.A. de C.V. Boletín Informativo (2006), 
http://www.telmex.com/mx/corporativo/salaPrensa_ComPrensa2006_060403ev.html 
(discussing a joint venture between Telmex and Verizon). 
 103. See, e.g., ESTUDIO COMPARATIVO INTERNACIONAL DE TELEFONÍA FIJA 
UTILIZANDO LA METODOLOGÍA DE CANASTAS 5 (2006), 
http://www.telmex.com/mx/corporativo/pdf/estudio_nera_tarifas.pdf . 
 104. David Haugh, Roselyne Jamin & Bruno Rocha, Maximising Mexico’s Gains 
From Integration in the World Economy, 31 tbl.4 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working 
Paper No. 657, Doc. No. ECO/WKP(2008)65, 2008). 
 105. See, e.g., Telmex Still Unable to Agree With Competitors on Interconnection 
Fees for Long-Distance Services, SOURCEMEX, Nov. 11, 1998, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/TELMEX+STILL+UNABLE+TO+AGREE+WITH+C
OMPETITORS+ON+INTERCONNECTION+FEES...-a053211223 (describing 
Telmex’s struggles in making agreements with other major telecommunications 
companies, as well as domestic pressure from alliance groups). 
 106. Decreto por el que se crea la Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones 
[Decree creating the Federal Telecommunications Commission], Díario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO]. 9 de agosto de 1996 (Mex.); see also Shanker A. Singham, Market 
Access and Market Contestability: Is the Difference Purely Semantics? A Business 
Perspective, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 337, 359–61 (1999) (discussing the inaction of the 
CFC in the face of its own and OECD findings of anti-competitive behavior on the 
part of Telmex). 
 107. This scope of this article is limited to the impact of WTO law. For a 
discussion of the effects of NAFTA on Mexican telecommunications see Sergio E. 
Aleman, NAFTA and its Impact on the Privatization of Mexico’s 
Telecommunications Industry, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 5 (2001). For a discussion of 
domestic efforts to curb Telmex’s market power see Oliver Solano, Rafael del Villar 
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Although Telmex did not lack domestic critics, Telmex’s 
accounting rate regime was not the subject of reform talks. This 
is because, like most other emerging economies, Mexico was 
and continues to be a net revenue recipient under the 
accounting rate system.108 As such, abandonment of the 
accounting rate regime would result in decreased revenues 
coming into Mexico. 
The Federal Telecommunications Law (FTL), which 
governed the routing of all incoming international 
telecommunications traffic in Mexico, formed the cornerstone of 
the regulatory regime challenged by the United States in the 
Telmex Report.109 The FTL required each operator of a public 
telecommunications network to possess a concession from the 
Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transportation.110 
The FTL further stipulated that such concessions would be 
issued only to legal or physical persons of Mexican 
nationality.111 In 1996, the FTL was complemented by the 
promulgation of the International Long Distance Rules (ILD).112 
The ILD established an accounting rate regime whereby the 
concessionaire with the largest percentage of the long distance 
business with a given country was entitled to negotiate the 
termination fee that would be charged for all calls originating 
 
& Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu, Challenges to the Effective Implementation of Competition 
Policy in Regulated Sectors: The Case of Telecommunications in Mexico, 26 N.W. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 527 (2006). 
 108. See International Telecommunication Union, Direction of Traffic: Trading 
Telecom Minutes Executive Summary (1999), http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/publications/dot/1999/page11_dot.html (discussing how the accounting rate 
system was favorable to developing countries). Calls originating in the United 
States accounted for nearly two thirds of all U.S.—Mexico telephone traffic. Elliot 
Blair Smith, Mexican Phone Company Sets Sights on ‘Telepirates’, USA TODAY, 
June 19, 2001, at 6B. See also Guermazi, supra note 88, at 96 (noting that 
developing countries recive large amounts of payments each year); Joseph & 
Drahos, supra note 91, at 110–11 (discussing how the accounting rate system was 
favorable to developing countries); Stanley, supra note 88, at 385 tbl.3 (showing 
that Mexico received the largest amount of net settlement payments from the 
United States in 1994). 
 109. Ley Federal de Telecommunicaciones [L.F.T] [Federal Telecommunications 
Law], Díario Oficial de la Federación [DO]. 7 de junio de 1995 (Mex.). 
 110. Id. at art. 11. 
 111. Id. at art. 12.  
 112. Reglas para prestar el servicio de larga Distancia Internacional que 
deberán aplicar los concesionarios de redes públicas de telecomunicaciones 
autorizados para prestar este servicio [International Long Distance Rules], Díario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 11 de diciembre de 1996 (Mex.). 
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in that country regardless of which Mexican carrier actually 
terminated the call.113 Thus, under the ILD if it were the case 
that Telmex terminated 51% of phone calls originating in 
Spain, for example, then Telmex would negotiate the fee 
charged by all other telecommunications operators for 
terminating the remaining 49% of the call volume from Spain. 
At the time of the United States’ request for a panel, Telmex’s 
predominant market share granted it the power to negotiate 
the accounting rate charged on all calls originating from all 
foreign countries.114 
During the course of negotiations at the WTO, Mexico 
apparently attempted to harmonize its then extant domestic 
regulations with its liberalization commitments under the WTO 
Telecoms Agreement by placing the appropriate restrictions in 
its Schedule of Specific Commitments.115 Section 2 of the 
Reference Paper contains the Mexican commitments to provide 
interconnection within Mexico to international service 
providers.116 The scope of the Mexican commitments under 
Section 2 is delimited by language in Section 2.1 which states 
that Section 2 commitments apply “on the basis of the specific 
commitments undertaken” in Mexico’s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments.117 Therefore, the obligations established in 
Section 2 are binding on Mexico only to the extent to which 
market access has been granted under Mexico’s Schedule of 
Specific Commitments.118 Mexico’s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments for telecommunications services, in turn, 
faithfully reflects the FTL’s requirement that all mode I supply 
 
 113. Id. at regs. 2:XII, 13. 
 114. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 2.2. 
 115. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Mexico—Schedule of 
Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2, 11 April 1997 [hereinafter Schedule of 
Specific Commitments]. 
 116. Reference Paper, supra note 8. 
 117. Schedule of Specific Committments, supra note 114, at § 2.1. 
 118. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.93–95; see also David Luff, Current 
international trade rules relevant to telecommunications services, in THE WTO AND 
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 34, 
39 (Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004) (noting that limitations to the 
obligations made by the WTO members are possible to the extent to which they are 
described in the Schedule); Piet Eeckhout, Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade 
in Services, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 211, 218 
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (noting that the specific 
commitments of market access apply only to the extent that a member has agreed 
to a service schedule); BRONCKERS & LAROUCHE, supra note 73, at 19. 
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of telecommunications services, that is in cases where only the 
services cross the border, must be routed through a company in 
possession of a concession granted by the Mexican 
Secretariat.119 Under mode III, the mode of supply requiring 
commercial presence by the supplier in both the exporting and 
importing Member countries, Mexico’s schedule inscribes the 
FTL’s requirement that a concession from the Mexican 
Secretariat be obtained in order to establish commercial 
presence in Mexico.120 Because only Mexican corporations could 
possess concessions from the Mexican Secretariat, the effect of 
Mexico’s scheduled limitations on mode I and mode III supply 
of telecommunications services was to require all foreign 
telecommunications companies to use the services of a Mexican 
telecommunications operator for the termination of calls within 
Mexico.121 This, at least, is the apparent reading intended by 
Mexico. 
III. RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
TELMEX REPORT 
Such was the state of play facing the Telmex Panel. 
Questions lingered regarding the extent to which the WTO 
Telecoms Agreement disciplined accounting rates and whether 
the Reference Paper’s requirements relating to 
“interconnection” applied when the hand-off occurred at a 
border. Moreover, given the fact that the services seemed to be 
supplied on a mode I basis from Mexico into the United States, 
 
 119. Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 114. The authentic Spanish 
text reads “el tráfico internacional debe ser enrutado a través de las instalaciones de 
una empresa con una concesión otorgada por la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes (SCT).” GATS art. I:2 specifies that under mode I, services are supplied 
“from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member.” 
 120. Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 114. GATS art. I:2 specifies 
that under Mode 3 services are supplied “by a service supplier of one Member, 
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member.” 
 121. Although Mexico’s intent was to preclude market access by foreign owned 
firms, Mexico’s schedule is best interpreted as a pre-commitment that signaled to 
other Members the intention to reform the terms of market access at a point in the 
future. See generally Rudolf Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, 9 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 455, 474 (2006) (noting that the opening of monopolies over time was a 
key factor in the extended negotiations over telecommunications); see also Leroux, 
supra note 13, at 258; Donald H. Regan, A Gambling Paradox: Why an Origin-
Neutral “Zero-Quota” is Not a Quota Under GATS Article XVI, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 
1297, 1314 (2007). 
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Mexico had seemingly shielded its domestic market from any 
competition by limiting its market access commitments to 
reflect the fact that its domestic regulatory regime did not 
allow for foreign ownership of telecommunications companies. 
Notwithstanding Mexico’s scheduled limitations, the Telmex 
Panel found that the Reference Paper’s disciplines applied to 
the facts of the dispute and held Mexico to be in violation of 
four separate commitments under the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement.122 This section analyzes the Telmex Panel’s 
approach, paying particular attention to the pivotal role of the 
individual consumer in the Telmex Report’s treatment of modes 
of supply. Based upon this factor, as well as the panel’s judicial 
methodology, Part III concludes that the Telmex Report is best 
understood as an instantiation of rights-based 
constitutionalism. 
A. MODES OF SUPPLY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CUSTOMER 
The Telmex Report’s rights-based orientation is manifest in 
the primacy assigned to the perspective of the individual 
consumer when determining the scope of Mexico’s 
commitments under the WTO Telecoms Agreement. As 
discussed above, one of the central goals of the rights-based 
constitutional project within the world trade regime is to 
transform citizens from passive bystanders to active subjects 
and bearers of rights under international trade law.123 The 
Telmex Report achieves this aim, in function if not in form, by 
shifting the lens of analysis for determining the scope of WTO 
disciplines from the telecommunications companies and States 
that have negotiated the terms of trade in international 
telecommunications to the individual customer. Although the 
WTO Telecoms Agreement was drafted to address the specific 
concerns and needs of monopolistic national 
telecommunications carriers, the Telmex Report reimagines the 
terms on which the concessions were granted based on the 
assumed understanding of the individual consumer. 
The critical passage in this regard comes in paragraphs 
7.29 to 7.45 of the Telmex Report.124 In this section, the Telmex 
 
 122. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.216. 
 123. See supra notes 28–43, and accompanying text.  
 124. Telmex Report, supra note 5. 
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Panel holds that the services at issue are being provided on a 
mode I basis from the United States into Mexico, meaning that 
the service is being exported from the United States and into 
Mexico. Recall with regard to mode I supply Mexico had 
specifically stated that all services must be routed through a 
company holding a concession from the Mexican Secretariat.125 
Also recall that with regard to mode III supply, Mexico had not 
committed to opening its telecommunications markets to 
foreign operators with a physical presence in Mexico.126 Faced 
with these two reservations, the only way that the Telmex 
Panel could reach the merits of the dispute was to determine 
that the services were being provided on a mode I basis from 
the United States into Mexico, thereby reversing the standard 
characterization of international telecommunications traffic.127 
In reaching its determination that the services are being 
supplied on a mode I basis from the United States into Mexico 
the Telmex panel relies upon the decisive influence of the 
individual consumer’s perspective. The apotheosis of the 
individual occurs at paragraph 7.42 when the panel states that 
“[w]hat counts is the service that the supplier offers and has 
agreed to supply to a customer.”128 Among a range of competing 
factors, the dispositive consideration appears to be the 
customer’s conception of the service at issue. The arrangements 
between the international telecommunications operators which 
had dominated the treatment and classification of international 
telecommunications service are subservient to the 
arrangements between the domestic provider and domestic 
consumer of these services. In the words of the panel,  
[I]n the case of a basic telecommunication service, whether domestic 
or international, or supplied cross-border or through commercial 
presence, the supplier offers its customer the service of completing 
the customer’s communications. Having done so, the supplier is 
responsible for making any necessary subsidiary arrangements to 
ensure that the communications are in fact completed.129 
Taken at its face value, the panel’s consumer-based 
reorientation of the economic transactions in question is as 
 
 125. See Schedule of Special Commitments, supra note 119. 
 126. See supra notes 115–121 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 128. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42. 
 129. Id. at para. 7.42. 
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distortionary as it is decisive; if the consumer believes that she 
is buying an international service, then WTO law should 
construe a given set of transactions as constituting an 
international service to the consumer. Accordingly, the Telmex 
Panel interpreted a set of transactions that had traditionally 
been considered as constituting an export from Mexico into the 
United as an export from the United States into Mexico.130 The 
traditional legal characterization of the telecommunications 
traffic between the United States and Mexico, however, would 
have effectively precluded the panel from reaching the merits of 
the U.S. complaint and left the individual consumer without 
legal recourse.131 This is because the WTO Telecoms Agreement 
does not discipline regulations relating to the terms under 
which services are exported from a WTO Member.132 Therefore, 
if the interests of the individual consumer were to be protected, 
the services at issue had to be characterized as imports into, 
not exports from, Mexico. 
While the centrality of the consumer’s role in the Telmex 
Report marked a new development for GATS jurisprudence, 
this was not the first time that the role of the consumer had 
been recognized in WTO panel reports. In US—Sections 301—
310 of the Trade Act of 1974 a panel noted that “it would be 
entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals is of 
no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix.”133 The panel in 
that case noted that “one of the primary objects of the 
GATT/WTO . . . is to produce certain market conditions which 
would allow . . . individual activity to flourish.”134 These 
statements acknowledge the fact that, individuals, legal or real, 
are the “real part[ies] in interest” in almost any imaginable 
trade dispute.135 The scope of the individual’s role, however, has 
remained sharply delimited. The Appellate Body, for example, 
has clarified that the expectations of private rights holders 
need not necessarily always be taken into account when 
 
 130. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208. 
 133. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
para. 7.73, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 134. Id. at para. 7.73. 
 135. ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: 
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2006). 
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interpreting the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPs”).136  
The role of consumers is also well established with respect 
to considerations of “likeness” for purposes of determining 
whether there has been discrimination against a particular 
product under WTO law.137 In this context, however, the 
perspective of the consumer is but a component of the broader 
inquiry to determine the competitive relationship between two 
products.138 It is the establishment of this competitive 
relationship, considering the evidence as a whole, that 
determines whether or not WTO non-discrimination disciplines 
will apply to particular goods.139 In the Telmex Report, the 
consideration of the individual’s perspective is contained in its 
discussion of the context within which mode I supply should be 
determined within the framework of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).140 In this regard, 
the dicta could be considered to be consistent with other WTO 
jurisprudence concerning the role of the individual. 
Nevertheless, the Telmex Panel’s categorical pronouncement, 
that “[w]hat counts is the service that the supplier offers and 
has agreed to supply to a customer”141 marks a departure from 
the language used in other panel and Appellate Body reports. 
The Telmex Panel’s formulation seems to focus on the 
consumer’s perspective to the exclusion of other evidence rather 
than contextualize the consumer’s perspective as one piece of 
evidence among many.  
 
 136. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, para. 48, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 137. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 92, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 
2001) (noting that the consumer will have a different view of “likeness” then 
producers); Appellate Body Report, Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 114, 
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999) (noting that determining whether a 
competitive relationship exists between products is not exclusively determined by 
consumer preference); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, 21, WT/DS31/R (June 30, 1997) (noting that likeness must 
be determined on a case-by-case basis); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic 
Beverages II, 20, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996) 
(discussing the discretionary nature of making a “likeness” decision). 
 138. Appellate Body Report, European Communities supra note 135, at para. 
117, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
 139. Id. at para.103. 
 140. VCLT, supra note 47. 
 141. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42 
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Ultimately, the Telmex Panel’s parsing and legal 
characterization of the set of transactions that constitutes an 
international telephone call confirm the primacy of the 
individual consumer in establishing the outcome. Unless one is 
willing to accept that the individual consumer’s perspective has 
a transformative effect on the interpretation and application of 
WTO law, how can it be the case that a transaction between a 
U.S. consumer and a U.S. corporation constitutes mode I 
supply “from the territory of one Member into the territory of 
[another] Member”?142 Unless the perspective of the individual 
is privileged, the Telmex Panel’s conclusions seem contradictory 
or “untenable.”143 The implications of the transformation 
wrought by the Telmex Panel’s focus on the consumer’s 
perspective are explored in Part IV below. 
B. APPLYING THE REFERENCE PAPER—VINDICATING 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
The shift of emphasis from the perspective of the 
telecommunications carrier to the consumer and the 
consequential determination that the services at issue were 
being supplied on a mode I basis into Mexico, however, did not 
ipso facto require the Telmex Panel to apply the disciplines of 
the Reference Paper to the facts of the Telmex Report. The 
interpretation of the scope of the Reference Paper disciplines 
relating to interconnection and accounting rates remained an 
open question even after establishing that the services at issue 
were being provided on a mode I basis from the U.S. into 
Mexico. While less controversial than the panel’s individual 
focused reorientation of the legal conception of the mode of 
supply services at issue, the panel approached these open 
questions in a form consonant with the underlying 
constitutional rule that lies at the heart of the rights-based 
constitutionalist theory requiring maximum trade 
liberalization as judged from the perspective of the 
individual.144  
 
 142. GATS, supra note 6, at art. 1(2)(a). 
 143. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 687. 
 144. See supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
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With regard to interconnection, the dominant view prior to 
the Telmex Report was that the term did not encompass the 
hand-off of telecommunications signals at an international 
border.145 Thus, even following the Telmex Panel’s finding that 
the services at issue were being supplied on a mode I basis from 
the United States into Mexico, the panel could still have held 
that the Reference Paper’s disciplines relating to 
interconnection did not apply. The panel, however, focused on 
the broad meaning of the term “linking” as used in the 
Reference Paper’s definition of interconnection in holding that 
Mexico’s interconnection commitments did apply to the services 
at issue in the Telmex Report.146 
The Telmex Panel also had little trouble dismissing 
Mexico’s objections that even if the Reference Paper’s 
disciplines regarding interconnection applied to the hand-off of 
telecommunications signals at an international border, the 
specific discipline requiring interconnection fees to be “cost-
oriented” could not apply. Mexico had argued that this was the 
case because these fees were in fact “accounting rates” and 
therefore could not be the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings as per the Understanding contained in the 
February 1997 Report of the Group on Basic 
Telecommunications.147 The Telmex Panel’s legal reasoning in 
this regard is sound. The panel states the fact that the 
Understanding cannot directly alter the scope of Mexico’s 
commitments under WTO law.148 Instead, the Understanding 
can only offer guidance to the interpretation of Mexico’s 
commitments under Section 2 of the Reference Paper.149 
Notwithstanding these facts, it has been argued that the 
Telmex Panel’s conclusions with regard to the Reference 
Paper’s requirement to provide interconnection at cost-oriented 
rates are correct only if “§ 2.2(b) of the [Reference Paper] is 
interpreted outside its context,” in the sense of VCLT Article 
31.150 However, while it may be correct to assail the panel’s 
interpretation of the WTO Telecoms Agreement as overly 
 
 145. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 146. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at paras. 7.102–06, 7.143. 
 147. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 148. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.126. 
 149. Id. at para.7.126. 
 150. Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208. 
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literalist,151 the panel’s stance may also be understood as 
implicitly constitutionalist. It may even be the case that on a 
rights-based constitutional view the panel’s approach is in fact 
consistent with the VCLT. For example, VCLT Article 31 states 
that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”152 Recall that for the rights-based constitutionalist 
the purpose of the WTO is the defense of the constitutional 
guarantee of free trade.153 Therefore, from a rights-based 
constitutional perspective, the Telmex Panel’s interpretation of 
the Reference Paper is not so much inconsistent with the 
context of the Reference Paper as it is consistent with the 
overriding purpose of the Reference Paper and the WTO 
itself.154  
C. THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
The Telmex Report marked a radical departure from the 
conventional legal characterization of international 
telecommunications services within the industry and WTO 
communities. By privileging the perspective of the consumer, 
the panel paved the way for an expansive application of the 
Reference Paper’s disciplines regarding interconnection. The 
aggressive approach of the panel, particularly with regard to 
establishing mode I supply between suppliers and consumers 
located in the territory of a single WTO Member, is consistent 
with the role envisaged for judges under a rights-based 
constitutional theory. 
The importance of the Telmex Panel’s broad assumption of 
judicial prerogative is most evident when compared with the 
 
 151. Chung, supra note 13, at 790. Chung also points out that strict reliance on 
the literal meaning of words “can be a useful tool to extend the scope of WTO 
competence.” Id. at 788. It has also been argued that excessive literalism risks 
results that contradict those intended by the negotiators. Richard H. Steinberg, 
Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2004). 
 152. VCLT, supra note 47, at art. 31.1. 
 153. See supra notes 26–69 and accompanying text. 
 154. The panel itself stops short of explicit endorsement of a constitutional 
justification, although it does state that a broad interpretation of the term 
“interconnection” is consonant with the object and purpose of the GATS. Telmex 
Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.121. 
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result that would obtain under the accepted practice within 
telecommunications law as agreed by States and 
telecommunications carriers, or on a strict application of the 
WTO scheduling guidelines as set forth by the GATT 
Secretariat. Prior to the Telmex Report, international 
telecommunications law and the telecommunications industry 
had consistently treated termination of international phone 
calls as a service exported from the terminating country and 
imported into the originating country.155 Applying this logic to 
the services at issue in the Telmex Report, there would 
concededly be mode I supply, but in the reverse direction.156 
Instead of finding, as the Telmex Panel did, that there was 
mode I supply of a service from the United States to Mexico, 
there would be mode I supply of a service from Mexico to the 
United States.157 In crafting a result that diverged from the 
previously accepted practice of States and telecommunications 
carriers on the one hand and the guidelines of the GATT 
Secretariat on the other, the Telmex Panel fulfilled the rights-
based constitutional conception of a strong judiciary that acts 
to protect individual interests by constraining governmental 
powers.158 
With regard to WTO scheduling guidelines, although the 
panel accorded “substantial interpretative weight” to an 
Explanatory Note issued by the GATT Secretariat,159 this 
Note,160 upon closer analysis points towards a different 
conclusion than that adopted by the panel.161 The Explanatory 
Note states that “the supply of a service through 
telecommunications or mail . . . are all examples of cross-border 
[mode I] supply, since the service supplier is not present within 
the territory of the member where the service is delivered.”162 
 
 155. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra Part I(c). 
 159. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43. 
 160. GATT Secretariat, Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in 
Services: Explanatory Note, para. 19(a), MTN.GNS/W/164 (Sept. 3, 1993) 
[hereinafter Explanatory Note]. 
 161. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43. 
 162. Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a). This text was repeated at 
paragraph 28 of Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), WTO Doc. S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001). 
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The Explanatory Note, however, does not support a finding that 
the telecommunications services at issue in the Telmex Report 
were being provided on a mode I basis into Mexico as the 
Telmex Panel states.163 
In the first place, it should be clear that the reference to 
“the supply of a service through telecommunications” in the 
Explanatory Note164 cannot be understood as a reference to the 
“public telecommunications transport services” at issue in the 
Telmex Report.165 As the Telmex Panel correctly observed,166 the 
GATS Annex on Telecommunications defines “public 
telecommunications transport service” as “any 
telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in 
effect, by a Member to be offered to the public generally [such 
as] telegraph, telephone, telex, and data transmission typically 
involving the real-time transmission of customer-supplied 
information between two or more points without any end-to-
end change in the form or content of the customer’s 
information.”167 Thus, for purposes of the Telmex Report there is 
no doubt that the services at issue are the public voice 
telephony, circuit-switched data transmission and facsimile 
services themselves.168 The ordinary meaning of the 
Explanatory Note, in referring to “the supply of a service 
through telecommunications,” establishes a distinction between 
the telecommunications service itself and the distinct service 
that is supplied via telecommunications.169 The Explanatory 
Note says only that the latter is an example of cross-border 
supply.170 On a proper reading the passage of the Explanatory 
Note to which the Telmex Panel cites says nothing about the 
 
 163. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43. 
 164. Explanatory Note, supra note160 at para. 19(a). 
 165. Telmex Report, supra note 5, atpara. 7.22 
 166. Id.at para. 7.22 
 167. GATS, supra note 6, at Annex on Telecommunications art. 3(b). The final 
gerundial phrase here cannot be construed according to the canon of reddendo 
singula singulis. To read the text thusly would result in an interpretation whereby 
only data transmission services would occur without changes in form or content of 
customer information. It cannot have been the drafters’ intent to indicate that this 
qualifier applied only to data transmission services, whereas information provided 
via telegraph, telephone and telex services underwent changes in form and content 
during transmission. 
 168. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.23 
 169. Explanatory Note, supra note 160 at para. 19(a). 
 170. Id.  
KILL. Final Read Formatted - Fixed CDL 12/10/2010  2:11 PM 
2011] CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WTO 103 
 
cross-border supply of “telecommunications services” in their 
own right, but rather only addresses services that use 
telecommunications as a delivery platform. 
Positive and negative contextual comparison confirms that 
the Explanatory Note does not address the question of 
telecommunications services as such. The full text of paragraph 
19 (a) reads: “International transport, the supply of a service 
through telecommunications or mail, and services embodied in 
exported goods (e.g. a computer diskette, or drawings) are all 
examples of cross-border supply, since the service supplier is 
not present within the territory of the Member where the 
service is delivered.”171 The negative comparison is made with 
the first category of cross-border supply identified by the 
Explanatory Note, “international transport.”172 Whereas the 
other two categories of supply include the word “service”, 
international transport does not. This implies that 
international transport is, of itself, a service, where as the 
other two categories enumerated concern only services that 
cross borders either “through telecommunications or mail” or 
“in exported goods.” This comparison establishes that the 
Explanatory Note’s reference to “the supply of a service through 
telecommunications” refers to telecommunications not as a 
service in itself, but rather as a modality through which a given 
service moves across a border. 
The positive comparison to be made here is between two 
prepositional phrases “through telecommunications” and “in 
exported goods.” As stated above, both phrases describe a 
modality through which a given service moves across a border. 
The text supports the conclusion that the Explanatory Note 
identifies “telecommunications” as an example of mode I supply 
only if the service itself and the modality through which the 
service moves across the border are read as constituting a 
single service. Yet if this approach is applied to “services 
embodied in exported goods,” this would result in a finding that 
the “exported goods” are a service that is provided on a cross-
border basis. Obviously this cannot be the proper reading 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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because “exported goods” are self-evidently not a “service” 
falling under the disciplines of the GATS. 
In light of the fact that the plain meaning and contextual 
analysis of the Explanatory Note establish that the Explanatory 
Note does not speak to whether or not telecommunications 
services are an illustrative example of the types of services that 
are provided on a mode I basis, the Explanatory Note’s 
reasoning takes on a heightened importance. The Explanatory 
Note states that the examples contained therein constitute 
mode I supply “since the service supplier is not present within 
the territory of the Member where the service is delivered.”173 
Transposing this text into the customer-centric parlance of the 
Telmex Panel,174 the Explanatory Note’s meaning is that mode I 
supply occurs where the supplier is not present in the territory 
of the Member in which the customer is present. 
Although the Telmex Panel emphasizes the same words in 
the above-quoted text, the panel’s legal conclusion does not 
cohere with notions of delivery and supply as articulated in the 
Explanatory Note, or indeed by the Telmex Panel itself. The 
Telmex Panel states that the critical factor in determining the 
mode of supply is the service that the supplier “has agreed to 
supply to the customer” and that the “supplier offers its 
customer the service of completing the customer’s 
communications.”175 The various inputs that the supplier must 
secure in order to provide the service are considered 
“subsidiary arrangements” which do not displace the primacy of 
the agreement between the supplier and the customer.176 
Therefore, if one were to search for the locus “where the service 
is delivered,”177 to use the terms of the Explanatory Note, this 
can only be the place where the customer is found in the United 
States. To state otherwise would be nonsensical on the panel’s 
own logic which acknowledges that the services in question are 
being supplied “to the customer” and not to the terminus point 
in Mexico.178 Thus, the service is being delivered, or supplied, to 
the customer wherever it is that the customer is to be found. 
 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
 175. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a). 
 178. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para.7.42. 
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On the facts of the Telmex Report, both the service supplier and 
the customer are found in the territory of a single WTO 
Member, viz. the United States. Therefore, it is patently not 
the case that “the service supplier is not present within the 
territory of the Member where the service is delivered.”179 
Accordingly, if the consumer’s perspective is truly the relevant 
level of analysis, a strict application of the Explanatory Note to 
the facts of the Telmex Report would require a finding that 
there was no mode I supply because the service supplier is 
present in the territory of the Member where the service is 
delivered. 
The text of the Telmex Report indicates that the Telmex 
Panel was aware that the identification of mode I cross-border 
supply of a service in a situation where both consumer and 
supplier are found on the territory of a single WTO Member 
was at least questionable. For example, the Telmex Panel 
stated that the “silence of subparagraph (a) [of Article I:2 
GATS] with respect to the supplier suggests that the place 
where the supplier itself operates, or is present, is not directly 
relevant to the definition of cross-border supply.”180 
Notwithstanding this assertion, the conception of mode I 
supply put forth in the Telmex Report has been undercut by 
subsequent jurisprudence that conforms to the proper reading 
of the Explanatory Note set forth above. In distinguishing 
between “remote supply” of a service and “cross-border supply” 
the panel in US-Gambling made clear that cross-border supply 
occurs “only when the service supplier and the consumer are 
located in territories of different Members.”181 This is strong 
evidence that the panel in Telmex was indeed overreaching in 
this regard. 
The Telmex Panel’s bold posture is best viewed as a 
manifestation of the privileged position reserved for judges 
within rights-based constitutional theory. In the course of 
 
 179. Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19 (a), supra note 162 
(emphasis added). Of course, the Mexican service suppliers are not present in the 
territory of the Member where the service is delivered, but as we have already seen 
a finding that the services at issue are being exported from Mexico to the USA on a 
mode I basis would have no utility in vindicating consumer interests. See note 155 
and following text. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 180. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.30. 
 181. Panel Report, US—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, para. 6.32, WT/DS285/R, (10 November 1004). 
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interpreting a document, the Reference Paper, that “makes 
eminent sense [as] an obligation to impose minimum 
competition-law requirements to incumbents, in full respect of 
the territoriality principle conferring jurisdiction,” the panel 
staked out a new course.182 That new course placed the 
individual at the center of the determinative analysis with 
regard to the scope of rights under WTO law and effectively 
expanded the liberalization commitments beyond what had 
been envisaged by the negotiators. 
Further, the panel’s embrace of a heightened role for 
judges in increasing liberalization is confirmed by the fact that 
the panel’s pronouncements on the centrality of the individual 
consumer in establishing under which mode of supply a 
particular service falls do not appear to be in the nature of a 
direct response to the arguments of either party. The United 
States had contended that the services in question were being 
provided on a mode I basis on the grounds that the traffic or 
transmissions themselves were a service and these 
transmissions were patently crossing the border.183 On the 
other side, Mexico’s submissions focused on distinguishing 
between the concept of a telephone call and the act of 
transmitting customer provided data by a supplier.184 The panel 
apparently took the initiative by itself to carve out a role for the 
individual in the international trade law relating to 
telecommunications. 
IV. LESSONS FROM TELMEX 
Although some express bewilderment at the seemingly 
innocuous introduction of constitutionalism at the international 
level,185 the stakes are undoubtedly high. Part III demonstrated 
how a rights-based constitutionalist approach can alter the 
outcome in a given trade dispute. Part IV considers the broader 
implications of the rights-based approach of the Telmex Report 
for the WTO both in terms of its jurisprudence and as an 
institution. 
 
 182. Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208. 
 183. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at paras. 7.25–26. 
 184. Id. at paras. 7.27–28 
 185. Fassbender, supra note 16, at 839. 
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A. COUNTERINTUITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TELMEX 
APPROACH 
If one applies the Telmex Panel’s customer oriented 
approach to certain services, the legal characterization of cross 
border transactions becomes the inverse of that which the 
negotiating parties would consider them to be. For example, 
imagine that the Telmex Panel’s dictum that “[w]hat counts is 
the service that the supplier offers and has agreed to supply to 
a customer”186 were to be applied to legal characterization of the 
transactions involved in the cross-border provision of customer 
service via telecommunications.187 Often, if not predominantly, 
in situations of cross-border customer service provision a 
customer places a domestic telephone call which is then routed 
across an international border by the service supplier. The 
customer’s call is then answered in the territory of another 
WTO Member from which the service, be it software support, 
financial advice, travel booking, etc., is provided. 
On a view which does not privilege the perspective of the 
consumer, cross-border provision of customer service via 
telecommunications constitutes a paradigmatic case of mode I 
supply: customer service is being exported from the Member 
into which the call has been placed and imported into the 
territory of the Member where the consumer who placed the 
call is located.188 If, however, the individual’s perspective forms 
the dominant prism of analysis, then the transaction becomes 
purely domestic because the consumer has placed a domestic 
call and has, we may assume for purposes of this discussion, 
contracted domestically for the provision of a service. The 
subcontracts and telecommunications routing that the primary 
supplier has concluded with the foreign service providers are 
recast as “subsidiary arrangements to ensure that the 
communications are in fact completed.”189 In the Telmex Report 
 
 186. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42. 
 187. Under the Services Sectoral Classification List the cross-border provision 
of customer service via telecommunications is capable of including services 
catalogued under Professional Services; Computer and Related Services; Other 
Business Services; and Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services. Services 
Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991). 
 188. See Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a); Council for Trade in 
Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), para. 28, S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001). 
 189. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42. 
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the panel’s focus on the individual consumer converted what 
was traditionally seen as an export from Mexico into an export 
from the United States. In the case of remote provision of 
customer service, however, the same approach would convert 
what was traditionally seen as an export from the Member to 
which the phone call had been routed into a purely domestic 
transaction, notwithstanding the clear cross-border aspects. 
This finding would preclude the application of any WTO 
disciplines and leave the Member in which the individual 
consumer was located free to place restrictions on the remote 
provision of customer service from other Members, even if the 
Member enacting the restrictions had made commitments in 
the relevant sectors. 
Although this recasting of international trade in the 
remote provision of customer service is a logical consequence of 
the panel’s focus on the role of the individual, it is equally as 
inconsistent with the goals of the rights-based constitutional 
project as it is with WTO law.190 Nevertheless, it serves as 
useful illustration of the fact that increased recognition of the 
rights of individuals within the world trading system need not, 
and indeed likely will not, ultimately lead to increased 
liberalization. Recalibrating the legal instruments of the WTO 
based on the rights and perspectives of individuals will lead to 
both trade promoting and trade restricting outcomes. Only by 
assuming that all affected parties will immediately see the 
wisdom of increased liberalization can blanket recognition of 
individual rights at the WTO function as a plausible path to 
increased liberalization. There are good reasons to doubt the 
validity of such an assumption. In fact, to the limited extent 
that WTO law has recognized individual rights to date the 
effect has been to empower individuals to inhibit trade, rather 
than to force further liberalization.191 
B. IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS 
In the context of the WTO it is clear that the outcomes of 
certain disputes have an increasing impact on ongoing 
 
 190. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 36 
INTERECONOMICS 98, 108 (2001). 
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negotiations.192 As established above, the Telmex Report 
employed a rights-based constitutionalist approach to the 
application of the WTO Telecoms Agreement so as to arrive at 
conclusions that seem contradictory, for example the finding 
that a transaction between a U.S. supplier and a U.S. consumer 
constitutes cross-border supply of a service. Despite these 
observations, the panel’s approach in the Telmex Report has 
elicited almost no overt adverse reaction with regard to 
negotiations in the intervening years; ongoing negotiations do 
not show signs of revisiting the panel’s conclusions.193 Indeed, 
even in the immediate aftermath of the Telmex Report the 
WTO Secretariat noted that Members were “remarkably 
uniform in calling for further improvements in market access 
and national treatment, the undertaking of commitments by 
Members that have not yet done so, and more widespread 
adoption of Reference Paper commitments.”194 The Chairman of 
the Council for Trade in Services did identify “scheduling- and 
classification-related concerns” in the area of 
telecommunications, but these are vague and of minor 
importance when compared with the scheduling issues to be 
addressed under other sectoral classifications.195 Overall, 
telecommunications liberalization continues to enjoy broad 
support among WTO Members.196 
The general lack of outcry among Members in response to 
the Telmex Report is likely attributable to the fact that the field 
of telecommunications law is in some ways uniquely well suited 
as a test case for building acceptance of judicial liberalization 
under a rights-based constitutional theory. Liberalization in 
telecommunications services carries an expectation of increased 
 
 192. See Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges, supra note 52, at 
650. 
 193. See Peng, supra note 10, at 305–06. 
 194. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Information Note by 
the Secretariat: Telecommunications Services, para. 2, JOB(05)/208 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
 195. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Report by the 
Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, at 14, TN/S/23 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
Also, the Chairman’s summary of the scheduling issues to be addressed under 
modes I and III make no mention of the complications arising from the Telmex 
Report. Id. at 21–22. 
 196. See Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, Rep. by the Chairman 
of the TNC: Services Signalling Conference, paras. 11–12, JOB(08)/93 (July 30, 
2008). 
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efficiency, technology and public welfare gains.197 As a result, 
telecommunications negotiations at the WTO have benefitted 
from the broad consensus among Members that a more efficient 
and technologically advanced telecommunications sector 
creates increased opportunities across other business sectors.198 
Indeed, much of the liberalization achieved in 
telecommunications during the Uruguay Round was 
attributable to the efforts of the financial services lobby and the 
telecommunications sector’s own technology driven 
liberalization.199 In addition, the fact that Egypt and Honduras 
have unilaterally inscribed schedules liberalizing their 
respective telecommunications sectors without receiving 
corresponding concessions from other Members demonstrates 
that the consensus recognizing the benefits to be gained from 
telecommunications liberalization has spread to developing 
countries as well.200 Mexico’s failure to appeal the panel’s report 
 
 197. See Chung, supra note 13, at 793–94; Massimo Geloso Grosso, Liberalising 
Infrastructure Network Services and the GATS 35 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Trade Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 34, Doc. 
No., 2006); Bernard Hoekman, Liberalizing Trade in Services: A Survey (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. WPS 4030, 2006); Daniel 
Roseman, Economic Impact of Trade and Investment Liberalization in the 
Telecommunications Sector, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 943, 943–44 (2002).  
 198. See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication 
from Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Hong Kong China, 
Korea, Norway, Singapore, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States, TN/S/W/50, (July 1, 2005); Special 
Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Cuba, TN/S/W/2, 
(May 30, 2002); Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, 
Communication from Colombia, S/CSS/W/119, (Nov. 27, 2001); Special Session of 
the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Chile, para. 29, 
S/CSS/W/88, (May 14, 2001); Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, 
Communication from Switzerland, para. 1, S/CSS/W/72, (May 4, 2001); see also 
Kalotay, supra note 99, at 822–23. 
 199. See Pierre Sauvé, Been there, not yet done that: Lessons and challenges in 
services trade, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
SERVICES 599, 607–08 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); 
Adlung, supra note 121, at 470–71; Cowhey, supra note 72, at 53–54; Roseman, 
supra note 93, at 84. 
 200. See Rudolf Adlung, Trade liberalization under the GATS: An Odyssey?, in 
GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 209, 214 
(Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008). The schedules are 
available at GATS/SC/30/Suppl.3, 5 June 2002 (Egypt), and GATS/SC/38/Suppl.2, 
16 September 2005 (Honduras). Pascal Lamy highlighted Egypt’s experience as a 
success story in a symposium held on the 10th anniversary of the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO DG Lamy celebrates 
benefits of opening trade in telecoms (Feb. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr517_e.htm. 
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has been cited as an indication that perhaps the Mexican 
government welcomed the opportunity to further its 
deregulation of telecommunications without the hefty political 
cost at home.201 
Members’ interest in overcoming intransigent domestic 
regulatory hurdles to liberalization could also account for the 
general acquiescence in the Telmex Panel’s reorientation of the 
legal characterization of the services involved which brought 
the hand-off of international telecommunications traffic within 
the discipline of the Reference Paper. As is the case for any 
service, the web of internal regulations involving any number 
of domestic government agencies can complicate and frustrate 
attempts at liberalization.202 Even a grant of full market access 
can be rendered meaningless by an uncomplimentary 
regulatory regime.203 Moreover, the disparate domestic 
regulatory approaches to “interconnection” that had been 
adopted after entry into force of the WTO Telecoms Agreement 
placed the credibility of the WTO at risk.204 Therefore, given the 
broad consensus in favor of telecommunications liberalization, 
 
 201. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 684 n.231 (contending that no 
appeal was made in order to shift the blame for the political fallout); but see Heinz 
Hauser, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services WTO NEWS 
(Univ. of St. Gallen/Swiss Inst. For Int’l Econ. & Applied Econ. Research, St. 
Gallen, Switz.), Nov. 2004, at 3, 
http://www.siaw.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wtonews11epdf/$FIL
E/wtonews11e.pdf (arguing that the fact that there was no appeal “can be viewed 
as an indicator of the high quality of the legal reasoning.”). Given the analysis in 
this article, the explanation provided by Matsushita et al. is more convincing and, 
moreover, coheres with the idea that the WTO is useful as a safety valve for 
depoliticizing certain issues. See Damian Chalmers, Administrative Globalisation 
and Curbing the Excesses of the State, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE 
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 351, 365 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds., 2006); Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 230; 
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 
436–37. It is also likely that industrial consumers of telecommunications would 
have been in favor of the Telmex Report and therefore may have lobbied against 
appeal. See Adlung, supra note 200, at 213. Although, Telmex no doubt is a 
powerful lobby within the Mexican government, domestic trade authorities must 
balance the concerns of other lobbies impacted by WTO disputes among other 
factors in determining whether or not to pursue a given course of litigation. See 
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
WTO LITIGATION 60–64 (2003). 
 202. See Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 299 (2009). 
 203. See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, GATS 2000: 
Telecommunications, para. 11, S/CSS/W/35 (Dec. 22, 2000); Peng, supra note 10, at 
305–06. 
 204. See Roseman, supra note 93, at 98. 
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the outcome legitimacy of the Telmex Report likely accounts for 
the muted impact of the more radical implications of rights-
based constitutionalism contained therein. 
To the extent that the success of telecommunications 
negotiations is attributable to the factors discussed above, this 
does not preclude the possibility that the deleterious effects of 
the Telmex Report’s approach to judicial constitutionalization 
could manifest elsewhere. It could be the case that the 
institutional deficiencies exposed by the Telmex Report in the 
form of a perceived widening of the liberalization commitments 
beyond the original intentions of Members is preventing 
breakthroughs in sectors that do not share the endogenous 
drive for liberalization that characterizes telecommunications. 
If States perceive that their basic bargains are recalibrated to 
take into account customer or consumer interests they may 
reduce their appetite not only for future concessions, but also 
for delegation of power to the adjudicatory organs.205 It has been 
observed that an “approach of resolving uncertainty against the 
regulator” can lead to lessened future liberalization.206 Thus, 
the failure to make progress in the education, health care, 
postal-courier sectors, etc. could reflect Members’ uncertainty 
about the ability to predict the scope of their commitments.207 
In this regard, the Telmex Report’s blurring of the lines with 
regard to modes of supply seems germane to the current 
stalemate. Observers do not predict a breakthrough with 
regard to competition policy and regulation.208 At least one 
reason is the perceived lack of clarity provided by the GATS.209 
Members’ reticence regarding uncertainty of commitments, 
combined with the tendency for GATS disciplines to strike deep 
into the heart of the regulatory state, is reflected in the 
 
 205. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 22, at 225–26. 
 206. See Regan, supra note 121, at 1315–16. The Appellate Body has stated 
implicitly that employment of a bias in favor of increased liberalization is 
inappropriate as a method of interpreting the covered agreements. See Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts, paras. 241–43, WT/DS269/AB/R, (Sept. 12, 2005). 
 207. See Services: Negotiations—State of Play, WTO.ORG, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/state_of_play_e.htm; see also Aaditya 
Mattoo, Services in a Development Round: Three Goals and Three Proposals, 39 J. 
WORLD TRADE 1223, 1231 (2005); Marsden, supra note 13, at 9. 
 208. See Peng, supra note 10, at 316–17.  
 209. See Alejandro Jara & M. del Carmen Domínguez, Liberalization of Trade 
in Services and Trade Negotiations, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 117 (2006). 
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proposal that future negotiations be predicated upon an 
understanding that services negotiations focus on non-
discrimination to the exclusion of other obligations.210 This 
approach presumes that a narrow focus on non-discrimination 
would elicit greater liberalization commitments.211 The evidence 
from the Telmex Report, however, demonstrates that if the 
rights-based constitutionalist approach were to gain currency 
among the WTO adjudicatory organs, then perhaps even 
narrowly designed commitments based only on non-
discrimination would be susceptible to expansive interpretation 
consistent with constitutional guarantees of economic freedom. 
C. ASSESSING RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WTO 
LEGITIMACY 
Because constitutionalization is “instrumental to the 
achievement of other values,”212 it is appropriate for the 
adjudicatory organs to adopt constitutional strategies that 
contribute to the achievement of the values for which the WTO 
was avowedly established. These include raising income levels, 
increasing employment and respecting sustainable 
development goals.213 The WTO, however, can only achieve 
these goals in the long-term if it enjoys institutional legitimacy 
and the support of its constituents. While the result in the 
Telmex Report undoubtedly contributes to increased 
liberalization, the consequences of the rights-based 
constitutionalist policy preferences and methodology evidenced 
in the Telmex Report could ultimately weaken the institutional 
legitimacy of the WTO. 
The Telmex Report, at first glance appears to have been a 
robust success in economic terms. With regard to outcome 
legitimacy, or the perceived ameliorative effect of an 
institutional action, the Telmex Report has had a salutary 
impact on the state of telecommunications commerce between 
the United States and Mexico. The Telmex Report dealt a blow 
to an entrenched monopoly that repeatedly demonstrated its 
 
 210. See Mattoo, supra note 207, at 1224. 
 211. Id. at 1224.  
 212.  Trachtman, supra note 16, at 630. 
 213. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 154. 
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willingness to seek higher rents at the expense of its 
customers.214 As has been seen from Telmex’s decades long 
success in maintaining its domestic market power, the 
intransigence of WTO Members in negotiating a transition to 
market-based accounting rates was in large part a product of 
the huge rents which the regulatory regime provided to 
incumbent suppliers.215 The pre-Telmex Report status quo, 
however, was wildly inefficient.216 The Telmex Report alleviated 
some of the inefficiency of this old system, a fact which is not 
denied even by critics of the panel’s reasoning.217 Data for the 
year following the Telmex Report shows that traffic originating 
in the United States and terminating in Mexico rose by over 
95%.218 Moreover, the opaque nature of accounting rates 
rendered any civil-society lead reform in this area unlikely.219 
The effect of the Telmex Report could therefore be seen as 
 
 214. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Cowhey, supra note 72, at 52–56 (discussing the problems associated 
with accounting rate negotiations from a political economy perspective). 
 216. In 1996 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission estimated that 
economic rents accounted for 80% of international telecommunications revenue. See 
id. at 58. 
 217. See Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 217. 
 218. See 2004 FCC INT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 1, 39–44 tbl.A1 (2006), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/mniab/traffic/files/CREPOR04.pdf; 2003 
FCC INT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 1, 38–43 tbl.A1 (2005), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/mniab/traffic/files/CREPOR03.pdf. Note, however, that 
the impact of the Telmex Report should not be overstated as trade related 
telecommunications issues continued to arise between Mexico and the United 
States following the Telmex Report. See generally 2008 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 8 
(2008) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Results%20of%20the%202008%201377%20R
eview.pdf (dispute involving mobile termination rates pending COFETEL 
resolution); 2007 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 4 (2007) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Results%20of%20the%202007%201377%20R
eview.pdf (dispute involving Mexico’s failure to implement COFETEL’s 
recommended interconnection rates); 2006 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 3 (2006) 
available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Telecom-E-
commerce/Section_1377/asset_upload_file43_9276.pdf (contention involving 
COFETEL’s failure to release interconnection rate model to resolve dispute 
between Mexican cellular and fixed-line companies). 
 219. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 27–28 (1982). The Telmex Report 
could even be described as democracy-reinforcing to the extent that it increased the 
transparency of accounting rates qua trade restriction. See John O. McGinnis & 
Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 546–48 
(2001). 
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positive when assessed by the criterion of the immediate 
perceived overall economic benefits.220 
Nevertheless, despite the consensus appraisal of the 
Telmex Report outcome, the economic impact of the Telmex 
Report is not unambiguously positive for all stakeholders. The 
Telmex Report can be seen as offering evidence in support of 
those who see rights-based constitutionalism within the WTO 
as a threat to a State’s ability to define and pursue its own 
development program. For years, developed countries such as 
the United States implemented a policy of cross-subsidization 
to support efforts to achieve universal service.221 This policy 
allowed telecommunications providers to expand into markets 
that otherwise would have lacked service.222 Today, developing 
countries employ accounting rates, notwithstanding their trade 
distortionary effects, as an important tool in efforts to expand 
their own networks.223 The principle benefit of this strategy is 
that it allows telecommunications providers to fund an increase 
in the reach of the telecommunications networks until a 
hypothetical point in the future when the system is eventually 
liberalized. On an uncharitable view, the Telmex Report short-
circuited the network development and liberalization process in 
Mexico by instituting a modern U.S. style industrial policy 
rooted in corporate autonomy.224 The reverse of the increased 
 
 220. See Gary N. Horlick, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: 
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 259, 259 (Roger B. 
Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
 221. See Sidak & Singer, supra note 13, at 20; Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 79, at 
333. 
 222. See Sidak & Singer, supra note 13, at 20; Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 79, at 
327. 
 223. See Guermazi, supra note 88, at 105. 
 224. See Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States, 
and the International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 651, 657–58 (2004). Recent interventions in the financial and automotive 
industries place the consistency of the U.S. ideological outlook in doubt. Certainly 
one cannot imagine the United States saying now, as it did in 2003 with respect to 
the negotiation of subsidies disciplines, that the “fundamental issue is: should 
governments be investing in private sector companies and if so, under what 
circumstances? While it could be argued that the nature of capital markets in 
certain lesser developed countries may lead to government investment in the 
private sector, what is the justification in countries with well-developed capital 
markets? . . . If the equity markets determine that a company will not generate a 
market return, the actions of any government which determines otherwise should 
be subject to strengthened disciplines.” Negotiating Group on Rules, Subsidies 
Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement: Communication from the 
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economic efficiency coin is that, in the wake of the Telmex 
Report, Telmex will have a decreased capacity to expand its 
network towards the goal of universal service, a right explicitly 
recognized in the Reference Paper.225 
Critics of rights-based constitutionalism warn against 
precisely these sorts of outcomes.226 By privileging economic 
freedoms, rights-based constitutionalism obscures competing 
concerns and drastically restricts the policy options available to 
meet other development or social goals. Moreover, by 
purporting to remove certain “constitutionalized” principles 
from the realm of negotiations or politics, rights-based 
constitutionalization can reduce the scope for democratic 
decisions at the national level.227 This can increase the WTO’s 
democratic deficit by shielding Members from accepting full 
responsibility for WTO norms.228 Most criticism in this vein 
focuses on rights-based constitutionalism’s distortionary impact 
on human rights.229 Nevertheless, the Telmex Report shows that 
a rights-based constitutional approach to trade can affect other 
policy choices, in this case, the progression towards universal 
telecommunications service. 
Even assuming that resolving disputes according to rights-
based constitutional theory would increase overall welfare, the 
constitutionalist claim that the economic gains from trade 
resulting from an aggressive judicial posture can endow the 
WTO with the legitimacy necessary to perpetuate its 
institutional mission has certain flaws.230 On a rights-based 
constitutionalist theory, the gains from trade described above 
are seen as providing a “utilitarian justification” for the 
 
United States, 4, TN/RL/W/78 (Mar. 19, 2003). 
 225. Reference Paper, supra note 8, para. 3 (“Any member has the right to 
define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such 
obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they are 
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral 
manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal 
service defined by the Member.”). 
 226. See generally Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 4; Sarooshi, supra note 224, 
at 658–60; Howse, supra note 69, at 95. 
 227. See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 4, at 228; cf. Klabbers, supra note 20, 
at 47, 50–51. 
 228. See TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL 
BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 34 (2004).  
 229. See generally Howse, supra note 1; Alston, supra note 29, at 824. 
 230. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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liberalization of the international trading system.231 Welfare 
promotion qua institutional goal is a “constitutional insight” 
that increases the trading system’s legitimacy.232 Therefore, the 
increased efficiency and net welfare gain of the Telmex Report 
directly supports the legitimacy of the WTO. This theory of 
legitimacy, however, overlooks the fact that while the WTO is 
ostensibly an agreement about non-discrimination and 
economic freedom, it does not solely memorialize these 
principles. The years of careful negotiations that culminated 
not only in the GATS, but also in the TRIPs, Technical Barriers 
to Trade, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements can 
neither be reduced to nor legitimately placed in the service of a 
simple mantra of liberalization.233 The WTO cannot rely solely 
upon an exogenous ideology to perpetuate its legitimacy, but 
rather must evolve for the benefit of its constituents.234 The 
question remains as to who its constituents are. Despite calls 
for opening the Dispute Settlement System to private 
litigants,235 States, or in WTO parlance, Members, remain the 
WTO’s constituents.236 Thus, while it may be proper in some 
circumstances for the WTO to consider the impact of its actions 
on citizens independent of their governments,237 it is another 
 
 231. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 796. But see Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 
Human rights as the primary objective of international trade, investment and 
finance policy and practice, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11 (June 17, 1999) 
(by J. Oloko-Onyango & Deepika Udgama) (stating that “liberalization in the global 
regimes of trade, investment and finance does not, ipso facto, lead to more positive 
impacts on the well-being of humankind in general or to the enhancement of 
economic development in particular.”). 
 232. See Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges, supra note 52, at 
663. 
 233. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 
404–06 (2000). 
 234. Trachtman, supra note 16, at 626. 
 235. See Georgios I. Zekos, The Case for Giving Private Parties Access to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT& TRADE 441, 449 (2007). 
 236. Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal 
Order, 17 EJIL 969, 974 (2007); Klabbers, supra note 20, at 43; Alston, supra note 
29, at 834.  States themselves prefer to view the WTO from a contractual as 
opposed to constitutional perspective. See Carmody, supra note 9, at 539; 
Trachtman and Moremen, supra note 22, at 229. 
 237. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the 
Promotion & Protectionof Human Rights, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 
Mainstreaming the right to development into international trade law and policy at 
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thing to depart from the bargains that the governments have 
struck. 
Without fetishizing certain conceptions of sovereignty or 
the WTO as a “member-driven institution”238 it is entirely 
appropriate to consider States’ view of the system when 
assessing the best way to move forward. In a domestic setting 
where judgments are typically backed by the Weberian 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, lack of this subjective 
legitimacy is unlikely to result in non-compliance. In the 
international setting, however, the paucity of coercive means 
for ensuring compliance coupled with, or even arising out of, 
the sovereign equality of the parties to a given dispute places a 
premium on the ability of a judicial institution to cohere with 
the expectations of the States that have vested the institution 
with its power. This setting places into high relief the words of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter that a “[c]ourt’s 
authority . . . ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in 
its moral sanction.”239 International organizations remain 
acutely reliant upon State consent to substantiate their 
legitimacy.240 States comply with decisions emanating from the 
Dispute Settlement System because it is conducive to the 
achievement of their overall aims.241 Although most States 
include compliance with their international legal obligations 
among these aims, if a given institution or its judgments are no 
longer viewed as legitimate, the institution will decline and its 
judgments will not be obeyed.242 
Given the central role of expectations in legitimating the 
WTO, dispute outcomes that fail to cohere with these 
expectations pose a risk to the stability and growth of the 
 
the World Trade Organization, transmitted by Note by the Secretariat, para. 16, 
U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (June 9, 2004). 
 238. See John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven 
‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 72 (2001). 
 239. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
 240. See Jürgen Habermas, Does the Constitutionalization of International Law 
Still Have a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115, 141 (Ciaran Cronin ed. trans., 
2008). 
241 .   Cf. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the United States Support International 
Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE SWORD AND THE 
SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 322, 353 
(Cesare P. R. Romano ed., 2009).   
242.    See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A 
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (2004). 
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system. If the effects of institutional practice in creating 
expectations which in turn form the basis for governmental 
decision are significant,243 then the downstream impacts of 
judicial constitutionalization may be deleterious. The impact of 
the adjudicatory organs on WTO legitimacy at the Member 
level can be measured with reference to the extent to which 
their reports accord with Member expectations. Generalizing 
the rights-based constitutional approach of the Telmex Report 
so as to consistently resolve disputes in favor of less regulation 
is one way to increase certainty regarding the ex ante expected 
interpretations of the Reference Paper.244 It is not clear, 
however, that such a bias was intended by the negotiators.245 As 
such, a consistent rights-based jurisprudence could erode 
Members’ tolerance for delegation of power to the adjudicatory 
organs.246 Rulings by the adjudicatory bodies that appear to go 
beyond the terms of the current negotiated concessions have a 
particularly delegitimizing effect at the WTO because these 
outstanding issues are precisely the province of the inter-
Member political decision making process.247 As has been 
observed, “legitimacy is reduced when policy areas that were 
previously the object of authentic and effective political 
choices . . . are pre-empted . . . by coming under the control of 
politically non-accountable authorities.”248 
Nevertheless, the tendency to advance liberalization 
through the adjudicatory bodies is not solely a product of 
rights-based constitutional theory, but rather also an 
institutional feature of the WTO. As an institutional 
phenomenon, the pressure to liberalize through dispute 
resolution is a result of the peculiar asymmetry within the 
WTO between the efficiency of the dispute settlement system 
and the at times intractable nature of the formal rule-making 
procedures. This asymmetry creates pressure on the 
 
243.     See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 19 (1969). On 
the centrality of expectations within WTO law see Carmody, supra note 14, at 542; 
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adjudicatory bodies to bypass the negotiating table and create 
new rules in the course of adjudication.249 The ongoing 
standstill of negotiations only serves to heighten the role of 
dispute resolution in interpreting the agreements.250 Although 
this view has been advanced as a harsh critique of the WTO, 
the institutional incentive for rulemaking by the adjudicatory 
bodies need not be understood solely as a negative consequence 
of the WTO’s structure. As long as panels and the Appellate 
Body act within the bounds of the agreed texts, the ability to 
create rules through adjudication allows for the possibility of 
efficient clarification of otherwise unclear agreements between 
Members. As the panel itself noted, the treaties’ “constructive 
ambiguity” contributes to reaching a consensus during 
negotiations, but leaves treaties open to divergent 
interpretations in the event of a dispute.251 Judicial rule-
making also avoids the political asymmetries and resulting 
inefficiencies inherent to the “power-based bargaining” process 
which occurs at trade rounds and within the WTO’s formal 
policy development channels.252 
Within this nuanced view of judicial rulemaking, a critique 
of rights-based constitutionalist interpretation is not to be 
equated with a charge of inherent systemic judicial activism 
within the WTO’s dispute resolution system.253 Rather, what is 
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interesting is that the issue of constitutionalization, by its very 
nature, lies at the intersection of law and politics.254 By 
agreeing to compulsory dispute settlement WTO Members have 
implicitly consented to a degree of judicial discretion through 
the Dispute Settlement System. This makes it inevitable that a 
panel’s views on a matter may come to affect the outcome of a 
given case.255 It is only on a naïve view that treaties create a 
single immutable legal relationship that is preserved for all 
time.256 Therefore, while the rights-based constitutionalism in 
the Telmex Report may tell us quite a bit about the theory’s 
impact in a given case, the Telmex Report’s impact must be 
contextualized to take account of the fact that it represents but 
a single sample. Although the Telmex Report demonstrates that 
a general conversion to rights-based constitutionalism by the 
adjudicatory organs would likely undermine the legitimacy of 
the WTO, the response of the Members and the adjudicatory 
organs manifests the resiliency of the system. With regard to 
the response of the Members, in this case they seemed willing 
to accept increased liberalization in the area of 
telecommunications perhaps for institutional and sectoral 
reasons.257 Meanwhile, the adjudicatory organs have not 
embraced the bold view of the judiciary advocated in rights-
based constitutionalism. To the contrary, the subsequent WTO 
jurisprudence has assuaged Members’ potential fears of judicial 
overreaching by correcting the most controversial products of 
the Telmex Report’s rights-based constitutionalism. 258 Thus, 
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while the rights-based constitutional approach of the Telmex 
Report may have increased the uncertainty regarding WTO 
liberalization commitments, this isolated case does not appear 
to be a threat to the legitimacy of the WTO. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the Telmex Report vindicates a 
rights-based constitutional theory of the WTO. The contention 
that the Telmex Report marks a step-towards rights-based 
constitutionalization of the GATS, however, is by no means a 
prediction of future constitutionalization. Indeed, even in the 
most “constitutionalized” of legal-political regimes, the actual 
constitutional structures and rules are in a near constant state 
of flux.259 With that said, this article’s analysis shows that 
rights-based constitutionalism is not mere “purposeful 
scratching of a mainstream itch,” as has been said of other 
forms of international constitutionalism.260 Rather, the Telmex 
Report shows the potential power of rights-based 
constitutionalism as a theory that comes complete not only 
with an ideology, but with a specific model of a judiciary as 
accomplice in achieving its ideological goals. 
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